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ABSTRACT 
Collaboration, though identified as a critical component to the Homeland Security (HLS) 
enterprise, can be difficult to achieve when working in complex HLS environments or 
addressing the wicked problems that permeate the enterprise. Federal doctrine and 
directives tell us collaboration is important, but we are not told how to collaborate. 
Improvisational theater, on the other hand, is built on collaboration among performers to 
invent a narrative, performers who have been trained to collaborate. 
 Based on a distillation of improvisational theater into five key principles, a 
comparative analysis of established collaborative models, and a case study of 
collaboration in the homeland security environment, I believe that those working within 
the homeland security enterprise can apply the same principles used by theatrical 
improvisers. This thesis proposes a new framework for collaboration, the Improvisational 
Theater Collaboration Model. Utilizing this framework to develop collaboration training 
or as a tool to assess the efficacy of collaboration in homeland security environments are 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Collaboration, though identified as a critical component to the Homeland Security (HLS) 
enterprise, can be difficult to achieve when working in complex HLS environments or 
addressing the wicked problems that permeate the enterprise. Federal doctrine and 
directives tell us collaboration and coordination is important, after-action reports often 
cites a lack of collaboration or coordination as an area in need of improvement in our 
disaster response operations, and operational coordination has been identified by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency as a core capability for a jurisdiction’s efforts 
to provide homeland security. However, we are not told how to collaborate.  
 Improvisational theater is built on collaboration among performers to invent a 
cohesive narrative by performers who have been trained to collaborate. The principles 
that guide improvisational theater performers have been taught to children through the 
use of simple theater games and continue to be used to train performers in some of the 
most successful professional improvisational theater groups in the country. 
 This thesis has distilled the fundamentals of improvisational theater into five key 
principles in an effort to document how theatrical improvisers collaborate and create a 
model for collaboration based upon these principles. A comparative analysis of 
established collaborative models and a model based upon the principles of 
improvisational theater was conducted, and a case study of collaboration in the homeland 
security environment was studied through the lenses of a previously published model of 
collaboration and the improvisational theater model for collaboration. Following this 
analysis and case study, I believe that those working within the homeland security 
enterprise can apply the same principles used by theatrical improvisers.  
 This thesis proposes a new framework for collaboration, the Improvisational 
Theater Collaboration Model. This model serves at least two possible purposes for the 
homeland security enterprise. This framework could be used to develop a collaboration 
training curriculum to introduce those within the homeland security enterprise to the 
principles used by improvisational theater performers in an effort to facilitate 
 xviii
collaboration. This framework could also have utility as a tool to assess the efficacy of 
collaboration in homeland security environments and determine if, when, and how 
collaboration occurred during the response to an incident, the planning process for a large 
event, or in establishing homeland security partnerships. Each of these suggestions is 
recommended for further study into the Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model. 
 xix
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I think the fear of failure is why I try things… if I see that there’s some 
value in something and I’m not sure whether I deserve to attempt it, I want 
to find out.   
–Keith Jarrett, jazz pianist 
 
This is a narrative about homeland security. This is a narrative that offers a 
different approach to a wicked problem in a discipline rife with wicked problems.1 This 
is a narrative that may be about changing a culture but is more about nudging along the 
evolution of a culture. Frank Barrett said in his paper Creativity and Improvisation in 
Jazz and Organizations, “Improvisation involves exploring, continual experimenting, 
tinkering with possibilities without knowing where one’s queries will lead or how action 
will unfold.” That statement pretty well sums up my process for the conceiving and 
telling of this homeland security and improvisation narrative. This is a narrative about 
me, written through my observations from within the homeland security enterprise, and 
serving my need to creatively engage current and future practitioners, leaders and 
academics operating in the homeland security enterprise. This engagement, and perhaps 
the resulting innovation, may serve to increase the enterprise’s capacity to more 
adequately address the wicked problems that permeate this enterprise through enhanced 
collaboration and a desire to play well with others.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND HYPOTHESIS 
Once upon a time, I was an actor living my childhood dream of performing live 
theater in New York City. Then one day, a phone call brought me to the roof of my East 
Village apartment in lower Manhattan to watch smoke billow and flames lap from a hole 
in the center of the upper floors of one of the World Trade Center towers, allegedly 
                                                 
1 In his book, “Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems,” J. Conklin, 
Ph.D. describes wicked problems as having the following characteristics identified by Horst Rittel: 1: You 
don’t understand the problem until you have a solution. 2: Wicked problems have no stopping rule. 3: 
Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong. 4: Every wicked problem is essentially unique and 
novel. 4: Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operations.” 6: Wicked problems have no given 
alternative solutions (Conklin, 2006). 
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caused by the impact of a small airplane. Minutes later I saw what looked at first like 
another helicopter floating behind the other World Trade Center tower. Then the shape 
seemingly morphed into an airplane. As the airplane drew closer to the tower, and its 
wings began to tilt, I leaned my body to the left, hoping the aircraft would follow the 
movement of my body and avoid hitting the tower, as a baseball player tries to keep a line 
drive inside the foul pole. The airplane disappeared behind the second tower and emerged 
in a ball of flame and debris from the other side. 
I did not experience an epiphany at that moment about the direction for my life, 
but as the hours passed, I began to grieve not only for the victims of those attacks, but for 
myself as well. I began to feel worse about not being able to do anything to help than for 
what had happened a little more than a mile from my apartment and at the Pentagon and a 
field in Pennsylvania. That feeling of helplessness began to bother me. I started 
researching opportunities to volunteer in my community to learn about this emergency 
management business I had been hearing about. This research led me to connect with a 
Community Emergency Response Team in Battery Park City across the street from the 
World Trade Center, an opportunity to join a volunteer search and rescue team and after 
moving to a city north of Manhattan become a volunteer firefighter while working 
towards my undergraduate degree in public administration and emergency management.  
This career change took me out of a world I had lived in from a very early age, 
surrounded by singers, dancers, writers, actors and all other types of artistic creativity. I 
now found myself surrounded by firefighters, police officers, emergency medical 
technicians, and bureaucrats; people in uniforms or neckties. I kept hoping my creative 
background would be of benefit in this new career I had chosen, but was told more than 
once that creativity or independent thought was not to be considered an asset in a 
profession where wandering beyond carefully written Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) could cost lives. My observations and experience, however, have shown this not 
to be the case, and that creativity can thrive in homeland security. While SOPs, 
legislation, and scope of practice guides much of what homeland security practitioners do 
on a daily basis, innovation and creativity touches almost every corner of this enterprise. 
The design of new safety devices for firefighters and law enforcement officers, the use of 
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Radio Frequency Identification chips to track hazardous material shipments, and 
advances in automatic license plate readers are all innovations to homeland security and 
examples of creativity within the homeland security enterprise. Innovations can also be 
disruptive before they become the norm. At one time, insurance companies privately 
funded all fire departments, but the shift to public, government-funded fire departments, 
which at the time it was introduced was a disruptive innovation, is now the preferred fire 
service model. X-ray machines at security checkpoints were disruptive innovation when 
introduced but have become a completely normal and an expected part of commercial 
aviation. This narrative hinges upon the belief, supported by observation and experience, 
that homeland security is open to innovation and creativity. 
I have also observed that a cornerstone of homeland security, and the necessity for 
agencies and organizations with a public safety mission to collaborate to solve problems, 
has largely been untouched by innovation. That is not to say there have not been 
innovations or flashes of genius that have impacted collaborative capacity. Certainly 
innovations in technology have allowed information to be shared more quickly, 
communication to occur more clearly and across wider geographical areas, but those 
innovations do not address the basic function of the collaborative process during 
emergency and disaster responses, and that is to make decisions in concert with the other 
coordinating agencies and organizations. I am concerned with the way agencies and 
organizations, at times, collaborate, or rather, do not collaborate. A recent report by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that while federal departments like the 
Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security have processes to measure 
information sharing and collecting, field-based entities are not held accountable for inter-
agency coordination, nor is there a mechanism in place to measure coordination or 
collaboration. (GAO, 2013, p. 33) I propose agencies and organizations within the 
homeland security enterprise can be better collaborative partners. I have a fair amount of 
experience working in emergent collaborative environments in the form of 
improvisational theater and believe this experience can be applied to this problem. 
Reaching back into my past may help me explain how I arrived to a novel approach to 
this wicked problem. 
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As an actor, I was most influenced by my work with Paul Sills, founder of The 
Second City and considered by many to be the originator of improvisational theater 
performance. Over the span of several years, I was a student in his improvisation classes, 
was directed by him in a scripted performance developed through improvisation and was 
his assistant director for one of his Story Theater productions in New York City. The 
years working with Sills served as the basis for the development of my understanding of 
the principles of improvisation found in this narrative. Homeland security, like most 
things, has evolved through innovation and creativity, as illustrated through the examples 
provided earlier in this chapter. That innovation, however, has not yet extended into 
multi-agency collaboration. The principles of improvisational theater may improve the 
ability of agencies and organizations that make up the homeland security enterprise to 
work in a collaborative space.  
Improvisation requires a performer to listen to what is being said by his or her 
fellow players and observe what they are doing, as props are often created through 
pantomime. The improvisational performer must remain flexible because preconceived 
narratives are derailed as soon as another player does or says something that is not part of 
the imagined “script.” Improvisational actors do not have set rules they follow but are 
guided in their performance through the use of five widely accepted principles of 
theatrical improvisation that have emerged through the work of Sills, Viola Spolin, Keith 
Johnstone, Del Close, and others. These principles, which are defined primarily through 
my experiences studying, performing, observing and directing improvisational theater  
are outlined below. 
1. Principle 1: Progress the Action  
In improvisational theater, the goal is to keep the audience entertained. If the 
narrative stops, or ceases to move forward, the audience will lose interest. It is important 
that the players focus on agreement and on progress and do not get mired down in 
perceived mistakes or disagreements. This principle also focuses the performer’s 
dialogue and action on the narrative and not on being humorous or clever or attempting to 
wedge a preconceived idea into an emergent story. 
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2. Principle 2: Yes, and…  
Improvisational actors are trained to accept offers put forward by their fellow 
players, often by choosing to say “Yes, and…” instead of “No” or “Yes, but…” The word 
“No” works as a stop sign in improvised theater, halting any action or momentum built to 
that point. If one player says “Let’s celebrate your birthday tonight,” a response of “Yes, 
and… let’s celebrate at the new tango dancing club that just opened” will likely lead to 
many more possibilities than saying “No.”  
3. Principle 3: Allow What is Presented to Change You  
In improvisational theater, new information is constantly being introduced, either 
by fellow players or in some performances via audience suggestions. The players must 
take that new information and incorporate it into their creative process. This new 
information can inspire ideas and change the direction of the narrative. It also keeps the 
players present in the scene and requires them to focus attention on the actions of their 
fellow players. It forces the players to abandon personal agendas and develop a new path 
within the narrative in collaboration with their co-players.  
4. Principle 4: Make Your Fellow Players Look Brilliant  
On the surface, this principle may appear to advocate for glossing over errors or 
mistakes. In improvisation, there really are no mistakes, so instead this principle 
encourages setting up fellow players for success, not failure. Often times, improvisational 
actors do not have set pieces or props to rely on when performing, only other players. It is 
important for these players to recognize the contributions of their fellow players and not 
sabotage their performance. Improvisational actors must also provide their fellow players 
with the tools they need to do their job. If one player approaches another during a scene 
and asks for an ice cream cone, the other player best serves the scene and their fellow 
player by scooping some ice cream into a cone and handing it to their partner. If the 
fellow player says, “But, you are at a pet shop,” then, the one player appears to have 
made some sort of mistake and the narrative cannot progress. 
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5. Principle 5: Serve the Good of the Whole  
Improvisational theater is generally an ensemble performance. There is no leading 
performer, and the players utilize the principles mentioned above to support the 
performance of the whole. This ensemble approach to creating a narrative places each 
performer on the same plane and allows primary characters to emerge based upon the 
progression of the narrative, and not on predetermined ideas of who will be the lead 
performer. This principle guides improvisational theater performers towards elevating the 
narrative, as opposed to elevating him or her or another performer.  
Homeland Security is, in many ways, improvised everyday. While the 
Transportation Security Administration checkpoint screener at the Albuquerque 
International Sunport may understand the details and subtleties of his or her role in 
protecting the flying public and be able to direct a passenger through the screening 
process by rote, what that screener will encounter through the course of his or her shift is 
very much unknown. The story of who will come to their checkpoint, their demeanor, the 
contents of their carry-on bag, or the precise liquid measurements of their tube of 
toothpaste becomes known only as it happens in real time, exactly how a theatrical 
improviser has the narrative he or she is working within revealed. Reacting, or making 
decisions based upon that unfolding narrative is experienced hundreds, if not thousands, 
of times each day by operators and analysts performing functions within the homeland 
security enterprise. The yet untapped benefit of the introduction of improvisation into 
homeland security lies beyond the individual decision-making process and ones ability to 
think on their feet. The benefit extends to the collaborative nature of homeland security. 
If each agency, organization, jurisdiction, or private company working within the 
homeland security enterprise can view itself and its counterparts as performers in an 
improvised play and accept that each performer must rely on each other, allow 
themselves to be relied upon, share successes and failures without becoming mired in 
finger-pointing and focus instead on moving toward the desired outcome, then 
improvisational theater and its guiding principles will have increased their capacity to 
collaborate. This will serve to improve the collaborative process that is so important to 
homeland security. 
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An improviser being asked to create or contribute to a compelling narrative on the 
spot puts that performer at risk of failure. It is important, then, that the rest of the 
performers share that risk with each other and one performer does not stand out from the 
rest, either in a positive or negative context. Shared risk is also important among agencies 
and organizations engaged in collaboration to solve a problem, make a decision, or 
manage an incident.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The improviser in me wants to assume that the idea of applying these principles of 
improvisation to homeland security collaboration makes sense and works. Can these 
principles help facilitate collaboration? Yes, and... However, the academic in me 
understands this idea must be supported through research and study. To satisfy my 
academic voice, I will state that the primary question for which this narrative seeks an 
answer is this: Can improvisational theater principles be applied to the homeland security 
collaborative environment? 
The development of this narrative also needed to discover answers to several 
other questions to support the idea that improvisation can, in fact, be applied to homeland 
security. Are the principles of improvisation fairly consistent among the leading 
improvisational theater practitioners? What other models have been applied to the 
collaborative process, and are any of these specific to the homeland security landscape? 
Is there evidence of the principles of improvisation having been successfully applied to 
the collaborative space within which the homeland security enterprise so often operates?  
The ability to find answers to the questions above required some improvisation 
itself, starting principally with saying “Yes, and…” to the general idea that there may be 
improvisation that may be applied to homeland security and continuing with the idea of 
allowing what was presented to change me. There could have been a tendency to shoe-
horn this idea into a space in which it did not fit, but by accepting what was discovered 
through research, the applicability of improvisation into this homeland security 
environment revealed itself, and its utility was demonstrated throughout the research 
process. 
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C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS NARRATIVE 
This narrative seeks to stimulate dialogue across the homeland security enterprise 
about the application of these five improvisational theater principles to our collaborative 
efforts. Collateral discussion about seeking solutions to our wicked problems in unlikely 
places may also arise from this narrative. I would like that. This narrative was written for 
the broad audience of homeland security practitioners, policy-makers, elected officials in 
oversight positions, and especially those who consider themselves outside of the 
homeland security enterprise until they find themselves plunged into a homeland security 
role. All of these potential readers will likely find themselves, at one point or another, 
relying upon another agency or organization to fully accomplish a task, mission, or goal 
and will need to have the capacity to effectively collaborate. It is my belief that the pages 
I have written will make the case that our collaborative capacity can be enhanced by the 
improvisational theater principles I am putting forward.  
The application of these improvisational theater principles to multi-agency 
coordination is less about making stuff up or thinking on your feet and more about 
developing the same sense of shared risk improvisational actors have on stage during a 
performance that agencies and organizations should have as they coordinate during an 
emergency or disaster. The notion of agencies and organizations sharing risk during an 
emergency or disaster response may require a shift in homeland security culture, but this 
narrative will be supported by data, an analysis and comparison of that data through 
alternate collaborative models, and provide recommendations for making that cultural 
shift a small step towards an increased capacity for collaboration and not a blind leap of 
faith into an unknown, unfamiliar landscape.  
1. A New Model for Multi-agency Collaboration 
The principles of improvisational theater can be adapted into a framework or 
model to consistently apply those principles to the collaborative space and enhance an 
agency or organization’s collaborative capacity. While other models for collaboration 
exist (this thesis examines and offers a comparison of the improvisational theater model 
to the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity model developed by Hocevar, Thomas 
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and Jansen), this paper offers an alternative to those models. Some may say “If it is not 
broken, do not fix it.” Collaboration is not broken, but it is not quite healthy. The case 
study used in this paper points to numerous examples verifying that statement. Just as a 
carpenter has numerous methods to fasten or join two lengths of wood together (screws, 
clamps, nails, glue, dowels, biscuits, tongue-and-groove joints, and dove tail joints to 
name a few), so too should the homeland security practitioner have, at his or her disposal, 
several tools or methods for working in the collaborative space. 
In continuing with the woodworking analogy, one method for fastening wood 
may not be appropriate, or even possible, for every application. A woodworker may feel 
more comfortable with a specific method, may use another in an attempt to increase 
efficiency or cost, and may use still another for aesthetics. If we, the practitioners of 
homeland security, are limited in how we approach collaboration within the enterprise, 
we are perhaps undermining the collaborative process itself. By adding tools to the 
proverbial toolbox, our chances of finding the proper tool to fasten two boards, or in the 
case of homeland security, successfully collaborate with our partner agencies and 
organizations, are increased. This paper aims to add some additional tools to our 
collaborative toolbox. 
2. Opportunities to Apply the Model 
These principles can also be taught, and have, in fact, they have been taught for 
decades. The use of improvisational theater games began as a training tool and has been 
successful in other adult training applications2. For use in enhancing the multi-agency 
coordination capability, games that focus on accepting offers, storytelling, listening, and 
developing situational flexibility are perhaps the most appropriate. Games like “Yes,  
 
                                                 
2 ComedySportz, a national improvisational theater competition organization, offers corporate training 
through many of their licensees. For instance, the Comedysportz theater company in Richmond, VA offers 
corporate improvisation workshops, touting on its website, “Basic improv skills translate directly to the 
business world. Whether it’s creative thinking, public speaking, fostering group dynamics, acceptance of 
new ideas, or just learning to communicate more effectively – we can help! The best part is, you will be 
having a fun time together. No lectures. Let us help you to create the team environment you want to work 
in, by playing improv games while learning the crucial skills of communication, acceptance and 
teamwork.” Retrieved from http://www.comedysportzrichmond.com/index.php on March 2, 2012. 
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and…,” “Lines on the floor,” and “One word at a time story” have simple rules, 
opportunities for players to be coached, and are easily adaptable to include homeland 
security themes.  
As part of the training curriculum for the New Mexico Department of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management’s Local Preparedness Program, the “Yes, and…” 
game, in which players must preface their speech with “Yes, and…” any time they 
wished to address their fellow player. For this exercise, two players were asked to begin 
developing an Incident Action Plan for a flash flood. One player was assigned the role of 
a local emergency manager, the other as a state police district representative. During the 
first stage of the game, there were no parameters placed on what could be said, and the 
players, after five minutes, had made a decision to set up portable barriers to block roads 
with water rushing over them. For the second stage of the game, the players were cast in 
the same roles, given the same task of creating an Incident Action Plan, but the scenario 
was changed to a severe winter storm and whenever they spoke, they had to begin by 
saying “Yes, and….” Within perhaps three minutes, the two players had reached the 
decision to activate the local emergency operations center, contact the state Emergency 
Operations Center with an initial situation report, request aid for road clearing from 
neighboring jurisdictions, close the interstate due to deteriorating road conditions and 
open shelters and warming centers for stranded motorists. Although the titles, agencies, 
and authorities remained the same for both stages of the game, when each player was 
required to accept the offer of the other player by saying “Yes” and adding additional 
action-oriented objectives for the other player to accept by following their “Yes” with 
“and…,” decisions are made and consensus is reached. Even when the players disagreed 
about a task, the use of “Yes, and…” allowed them to find common ground without much 
conflict. For example, the statement “Yes, and let’s call the State Emergency Operations 
Center and provide a situation report.” was followed with “Yes, and let’s make sure we 
have enough accurate information to provide the state, so they have a good idea of what 
we are dealing with,” which was followed by “Yes, and I will have my Operations Chief 
verify the information we have and run it through the two of us before the call is made.” 
Had any of those sentences started with “No” or “Instead” or “I think,” the players could 
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have spent additional time debating the merits of an action rather than coming to an 
agreement on how to best achieve an objective one of the players thought was important. 
Other improvisational theater games that have been used to develop collaborative 
proficiency in the New Mexico Local Preparedness Program include “Who am I,” and 
“When I go to California.” These games, detailed in Viola Spolin’s Theater Games for 
Rehearsal, focus on the importance of listening (and remembering) what is being said by 
the other players, observing nonverbal cues and clues and not dismissing what fellow 
players are saying or doing (Spolin, 1985). 
Just as improvisers are coached throughout a rehearsal process, and their 
performances are evaluated and improvements suggested based upon these common 
principles, so too can collaborative efforts of agencies and organizations be evaluated 
during exercises, planning processes, prevention initiatives and emergency and disaster 
response and recovery efforts.  
The inclusion of these principles into the homeland security-training environment, 
and as a method to qualitatively evaluate collaboration among agencies and organizations 
across sectors and levels of government, are possible next steps for improvisation and 
homeland security. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The narrative of multi-agency collaboration being infused with improvisational 
theater principles has, in fact, been told. I suspect it has been told many times, but I do 
not think the authors knew they were telling this narrative. One of these stories, and the 
narrative used to support my narrative and inform my recommendations, was the tragedy 
of The Deepwater Horizon drilling platform fire and subsequent oil spill. The Deepwater 
Horizon story is filled with examples of where each of the five principles of 
improvisational theater were utilized to facilitate collaboration, or where they could have 
been used to overcome challenges in the collaborative space. Deepwater Horizon also 
contained examples of a more traditional collaborative model, documented by Hocevar, 
Thomas and Jansen in their 2006 paper “Building Collaborative Capacity.” My narrative 
will experience conflict in the form of a comparison of the improvisational collaboration 
 12
model and the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model developed by S. 
Hocevar, G. Thomas and E. Jansen, 2006. Although good may be expected to triumph 
over evil, there will be no value placed on one model over another. Instead, this narrative 
will suggest that these two models can be alternative or even complimentary approaches 
to enhancing the collaborative multi-agency environment, with one not necessarily being 
superior to the other. 
1. About Comparative Analysis 
This narrative, which is essentially proposing a different approach to 
collaboration within the homeland security environment, will compare this new, different 
approach with a more widely accepted collaborative model. Since the term “homeland 
security” can have different meanings to different people, a specific frame of reference is 
needed, whereby the comparison of the collaborative models can occur. The Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill disaster will serve as the common reference point for the comparison of 
the two models.  
In conducting this analysis, a “classic” comparison, as described by Harvard 
University’s Kerry Walk, 1998 will be used. This comparison will weigh each model 
equally and point out similarities, as well as differences, between the two models. Value 
judgments will not be placed on components of the models, as this paper is not meant to 
serve as a policy recommendation. It is my aspiration that at the end of this narrative, my 
reader sees two equally valuable models for facilitating collaboration in homeland 
security, one model being more familiar, the other, less so, but similarly valuable to the 
collaborative homeland security environment. 
The comparison of the two collaborative models will follow a point-by-point 
organizational scheme. While this organizational scheme can come across as something 
of a tennis match with the comparison volleying back and forth between models, this 
narrative will examine the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill disaster through the application 
of the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity model first, followed by an 
examination of the disaster through the application of the improvisational theater model. 
Those examinations will consist of an observation of the disaster as identified through 
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one of the disaster’s incident reports or after-action reviews, then that observation is 
analyzed through a component of the given model. 
Once each component of both models has been analytically applied to 
observations of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill disaster, the two models will be 
compared. This comparison will consist of a summary of each model’s applicability to 
collaboration within the homeland security environment followed by an exploration of 
the similarities and differences between the models and how they both can be utilized to 
facilitate the development of the collaborative homeland security space.  
2. About the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model 
Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen (2008) have written extensively about collaboration, 
much of which pertaining to collaboration within the homeland security environment. 
This focus on homeland security allowed their collaborative model to emerge as an ideal 
comparison to the improvisational model proposed in this paper. They have defined their 
Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity model as “the capability of organizations (or 
a set of organizations) to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in 
pursuit of collective outcomes” (Jansen et al., 2008). This framework also serves as a 
conceptual model to identify obstacles and enablers to the collaborative process (Martin, 
2010).  
This model provides five domains through which an organization’s collaborative 
capacity can be assessed. The model can also serve as a guidepost of an agency or 
organization’s efforts to improve its capacity to collaborate. Additionally, there are 
thirteen factors distributed throughout the five domains providing further assessment of 
collaborative capacity. 
The five domains and thirteen factors of the Inter-organizational Collaborative 
Capacity Model are: 
 Purpose and Strategy 
 Need to collaborate 
 Strategic collaboration 
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 Resource investments 
 Structure 
 Structural flexibility 
 Lateral Mechanisms 
 Social capital 
 Information Sharing 
 Collaborative Learning 
 Incentives 
 Incentives and rewards systems 
 People 
 Individual collaborative capacity 
The five domains, along with the thirteen factors, are illustrated in Figure 1: 
 
 
Figure 1.   Inter-Organizational Collaborative Capacity Model: Domains and Factors 
(From Hocevar, Thomas, & Jansen, 2011). 
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This model was developed following two studies of homeland security 
professionals during workshops meant to address the “how” of collaboration. Hocevar, 
Thomas and Jansen sought to better understand what enabled interagency collaboration 
and what barriers got in the way of the collaborative process (Hocevar et al., 2011). 
These enabling and inhibiting factors will be described in the next chapter. 
3. About the Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model 
The improvisational theater model consists of the five principles guiding 
improvisational theater performers described earlier in this chapter. This model frames 
these principles, so they are applicable to the collaborative nature of homeland security. 
Unlike the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity model, this model did not emerge 
through research or studies, but they resulted from an assignment for a homeland security 
class at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security in 
the fall of 2010. The assignment asked what I could teach homeland security. Not yet 
willing to consider myself a subject matter expert on much within the realm of homeland 
security, I recollected what I thought I knew better than most homeland security 
professionals: improvisation.  
A cursory glance of homeland security and emergency management literature, 
and the application of homeland security, revealed papers written about improvising 
responses with limited resources or making decisions with limited information. 
Essentially, improvising solutions to homeland security problems. I did not think that I 
could teach homeland security practitioners how to do those things, so I set out to teach 
what I considered, based upon years of practical application and mentorship under one of 
the pre-eminent improvisational theater practitioners, directors, and theorists, to be the 
essential principles of improvisation. I was not sure how those principles could be applied 
to homeland security, but trusted, somehow, that they could. The encouragement of the 
homeland security professionals who read my initial effort and saw that there was 
something to the idea provided a degree of affirmation. I applied the “Yes, and…” 
principle to the idea that they could be applied.  
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“Improvisational theater principles have a place in homeland security. Yes, and 
that place is in the facilitation of the collaborative process.” 
Through the course of the development of this paper, the idea that the principles 
of improvisational theater have a place in homeland security has been pushed, refined and 
expanded through the application of those very principles. This model is new, and not yet 
fully fleshed out as a functioning model, ready for battle, as it were. This model is in its 
infancy. Although this model has been applied through the course of this research to a 
case study, it is only one case study. The framework has not yet been applied to 
collaboration in the homeland security environment outside of the theoretical application 
to the case study. It is my hope that academics and practitioners who stumble across this 
paper will join me in continuing the research and development of this model as an 
alternative, innovative framework through which collaboration can occur.  
E. SUMMARY 
The homeland security enterprise has evolved over the past ten years through 
innovation and creativity. While there have been technological innovations that enhance 
the collaborative components of homeland security, the process of collaboration has been 
relatively untouched by innovation. The introduction of improvisational theater principles 
may improve the way homeland security agencies and organizations collaborate. 
This thesis will propose an alternative framework for collaboration based upon 
the five principles of improvisational theater and apply that framework to the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster case study, an incident with unique and well-documented collaboration 
successes and shortcomings. Examples of the improvisational theater principles being 
used during the Deepwater Horizon disaster will be analyzed, as will examples where 
application of those principles may have improved response efforts. A more traditional 
collaboration framework, the Inter-organizational Collaborative Model, will be applied to 
the same case study utilizing the same approach: examples where Inter-organizational 
Model domains were used, and perhaps, where they could have been used. These two 
models will then be compared to the Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model 
through a comparative analysis of the two frameworks. 
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This thesis will culminate with a presentation of findings, answers to the research 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the long history of humankind (and animal kind, too) those who learned 
to collaborate and improvise most effectively have prevailed. 
–Charles Darwin 
 
In committing this narrative to paper, and in an effort to write economically while 
endeavoring to fill in any gaps in this narrative, I felt compelled to determine if mine was 
a story that even needed to be told. What is already known about collaboration among 
agencies is important in making that determination. That, then, is where I have started. 
What has been written about inter-agency collaboration, why is collaboration important 
for the homeland security enterprise, and what other models and theories are already used 
for collaborative decision-making are all questions that have been asked, and answered. I 
have included a review of the literature that addresses those questions.  
A. SOME COLLABORATION KNOWNS 
1. Collaboration and Related Terms Defined 
The Government Accountability Office has defined collaboration as “any joint 
activity that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the 
organizations act alone (United States Government Accountability Office, 2005). Donald 
P. Moynihan (2005) describes collaboration occurring between networked government 
organizations, which provide governments “the flexibility to tackle problems that are 
beyond the scope of any single organization”. There are also subtle differences between 
the use of the word collaboration and words like coordination and cooperation. Leo 
Denise describes coordination as beginning with an assumption of differences. Denise 
states  
Different persons, different units, different units create overlap, 
redundancy, and/or separation without coordination. As in athletics, we 
are coordinated when the arms and legs move together everything falls 
together. Everything falls into balance, if not symmetry. Coordination is 
about efficiency… Coordination looks to inform each unit or part of the 
whole as to how and when it must act. Coordination is a framework used 
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to ensure that otherwise disparate forces will all pull in harness… In many 
cases coordination boils down to two conditions: That people and units 
know what they are to do and when they are to do it; and that they see the 
relationship between what they do and what the coordinated whole 
achieves… Coordination achieves efficiency of motion but tell us nothing 
about the consequence of motion. To speak of a well-oiled machine tells 
us that friction is reduced, but not that all results are achieved. (Denise,  
n.s., p. 2) 
Denise describes cooperation as being important but points out divergence is 
equally important. Challenging norms and assumptions can be viewed as uncooperative, 
and notes creativity comes from dissent, disagreement, and even conflict. Cooperation, 
Denise asserts, can lead to “group-think” and reluctance for individuals to innovatively 
contribute to a discussion. Denise also describes cooperation as the opposite of 
competition, and that denying competitive impulses during the development of strategy 
can be a hindrance (Denise, n.d., p. 2). 
Denise’s thoughts on collaboration focus on creation, as opposed to the focus of 
cooperation, which is agreement. Rather than striving to develop structural harmony, as 
coordination does, collaboration looks to entice spontaneity and divergent insights from 
those working within the collaborative space.  
Michael Schrage describes collaboration as: 
…the proves of shared creation: two or more individuals with 
complementary skills interacting to create a shared understanding that 
none had previously possessed or could have come to on their own. 
Collaboration creates a shared meaning about a process, a product, or an 
event. In this sense, there is nothing routine about it. Something is here 
that wasn’t before. (Schrage, 1990) 
Another term referenced in this narrative is collaborative capacity. This has been 
defined as the “capability of organizations (or a set of organizations) to enter into, 
develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes” 
(Jansen, Hocevar, Rendon & Thomas, 2008, p. i). This capacity can be built and nurtured 
through the development of partnerships across all levels of government. These “vibrant” 
relationships include mutual dependency, a common purpose, trust and a long-term 
commitment to the partnership (Weber, Lovrich, & Gaffney, 2007). Hocevar et al. (2004, 
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2006, and 2008) have written at length on the notion of measuring an organization’s 
capacity to collaborate. Their research, utilizing homeland security subject matter 
experts, has led to their development of a collaboration model that can identify and assess 
an organization’s collaborative capacity. 
Collaboration requires more than one participant, is used to achieve a goal, 
whether that goal is a plan, policy, or operational objective, and when effective, acts as a 
force-multiplier, creating better results than an individual agency or organization could 
have achieved on their own. 
2. Homeland Security and Collaboration 
Over the past ten years, homeland security policy has been driven from the 
national level. Strategic documents and presidential directives have laid the foundation 
for much of what the homeland security enterprise does at the local, state and federal 
level. These policies, strategies and directives are outlined below as they relate to 
collaboration within the homeland security enterprise. 
Among the homeland security policies and strategies developed at the national 
level since 2001 are the two National Strategy for Homeland Security documents released 
in 2002 and 2007, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 from 2003, the 
National Incident Management directives originally published in 2004 and revised in 
2008, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review from 2010, Presidential Policy 
Directive 8 from 2011, which replaced the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 
from 2003; and, the National Response Framework from 2008, which replaced the 
National Response Plan from 2004. 
There are at least seven definitions of homeland security (Bellavita, 2008). In the 
next paragraph, I will propose an eighth. The 2002 and 2007 National Strategies for 
Homeland Security defines Homeland Security as “…a concerted national effort to 
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from the attacks that do occur” (DHS, 
2002; DHS, 2007). The 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) was 
written as a “strategic framework to guide the activities of participants in homeland 
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security towards a common end” (DHS, 2010), and served as the Obama 
Administration’s homeland security strategic document. The QHSR does not offer the 
concise homeland security definition put forth in the 2002 and 2007 Strategies, but 
provides several paragraphs describing homeland security as “an intersection of evolving 
threats and hazards,” which includes combining law enforcement, emergency response, 
civil defense, customs, border patrol, and immigration responsibilities under “one 
overarching concept” to “breakdown longstanding stovepipes that have been and could 
still be exploited by those seeking to harm America” (DHS, 2010). The QHSR includes 
disasters (without specifying naturally-occurring or man-made) as a role statutorily 
assigned to the Secretary of the federal Department of Homeland Security. 
These definitions of, or efforts to define, homeland security, focus almost entirely 
on terrorism. Yet, the homeland security enterprise also contends with traditional crime, 
immigration and border patrol issues, natural disasters and accidental man-made 
emergencies and their impact on lives, property and the economy. In examining the 
creation of the federal Department of Homeland Security, 3  language from national 
homeland security strategic documents, and policy directives, homeland security is less 
about a particular threat, hazard, discipline, agency, cause, or consequence and is entirely 
about coordinating efforts of multiple entities. In his book Systems Under Stress, Donald 
F. Kettl described homeland security as being primarily about multi-agency coordination, 
complex partnerships across all levels of government, and complex links between the 
private and public sectors. I concur with this description of the fundamental trait of 
homeland security. Therefore, when referencing homeland security in this narrative, I 
will be referring to the following definition: 
Homeland security is the collaborative effort of agencies and 
organizations, with a public safety mission or interest, as they carry out 
their specific public safety role.4 
                                                 
3 The creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 combined previously separate 
agencies within several federal departments into a single department, in an effort to “further unify and 
coordinate national homeland security efforts” (http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/gc_1297963906741.shtm).  
4 As used in the context of this definition, the term “public safety” refers to the provision of protection 
against events that could cause damage to property or infrastructure or harm to the general public as a result 
of crimes, emergencies or disasters, both naturally-occurring or human-caused.  
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Defining homeland security is a story in and of itself but providing the working 
definition above allows for some clarity in this narrative and the perspective from which 
homeland security is viewed as this narrative is told, and the basis for framing the 
supporting the hypothesis. 
The National Incident Management System, or NIMS, was developed to provide a 
“consistent nationwide template to enable federal, state, tribal, and local governments, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector to work together to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, 
regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity” (DHS, 2008, p. i). To that end, NIMS 
states: 
A comprehensive national approach, applicable at all jurisdictional levels 
and across functional disciplines, improves the effectiveness of emergency 
management/response personnel across the full spectrum of potential 
incidents and hazard scenarios (including but not limited to natural 
hazards, terrorist activities, and other manmade disasters). Such an 
approach improves coordination and cooperation between public and 
private agencies/organizations in a variety of emergency management and 
incident response activities. The National Incident Management System 
framework sets forth the comprehensive national approach. (DHS, 2008,  
p. 5) 
Building upon the importance of collaboration outlined in the NIMS, the 2010 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review contends: 
Preserving continuity of government is essential to the stability of the 
Nation. Detecting, disrupting, and responding to crises under any 
contingency requires collaboration throughout the homeland security 
enterprise. (DHS, 2010, p. 43) 
At least two Government Accountability Reports have included recommended 
actions for agencies to take in order to improve their ability to collaborate. A 2005 GAO 
report, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 
Collaboration Amoung Federal Agencies, recommended the following practices to 




 Define and articulate a common outcome; 
 Establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; 
 Identify and address needs by leveraging resources; 
 Agree on roles and responsibilities; 
 Establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate 
across agency boundaries; 
 Develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; 
 Reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency 
plans and reports; 
 Reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through 
performance management systems. 
These recommendations were supported in a second GAO report in 2010, which 
cited four actions agencies should take to improve interagency collaboration for national 
security. These actions include: 
 Develop and implement overarching strategies 
 Create collaborative organizations. 
 Develop a well-trained workforce. 
 Share and integrate national security information across agencies. 
These inhibiting and facilitating factors to collaboration provide an understanding 
of what collaboration may be and begins to drift towards how to collaborate. But 
recommendations like “create collaborative organizations” are still putting the proverbial 
cart before the horse. How those organizations are to be created is still largely unknown. 
The administration of President Obama appears to be continuing down the path of 
emphasizing the importance of collaboration to our nation’s homeland security efforts. 
President Obama’s 2011 Presidential Policy Directive- 8 (PPD-8) stressed concepts like 
“all-of-Nation” capabilities and states “Our national preparedness is the shared 
responsibility of all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and 
individual citizens” (Obama, 2011). The National Preparedness Goal, which was 
mandated through PPD-8, describes the importance of collaboration when stating the 
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security of the homeland “requires the execution of terrorism prevention through 
extensive collaboration with government and nongovernmental entities, international 
partners, and the private sector” (U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, p. 4).  
While these policy and guidance documents speak to the need to collaborate, for 
the practitioner the reasons for collaboration come less from doctrine developed in 
Washington and more from the understanding that often times a single agency, 
organization, or jurisdiction cannot reach the desired outcome or resolution of an 
incident, emergency or wicked problem on their own. Tangible benefits like equipment or 
subject matter expertise and intangible benefits like increased organizational credibility 
may motivate inter-agency collaboration (O’Leary & Bingham, 2009). While the 
motivation behind collaborations may vary, agencies sometimes collaborate solely 
because they are “unable to accomplish their goals unilaterally, either because they do not 
exercise complete authority over the policy area or because they lack important 
resources” (O’Leary & Bingham, 2009, p. 33). 
These policy, guidance and strategy documents contain multiple references to 
“what” of collaboration within the homeland security enterprise, but they do not identify 
strategies for achieving them, or the “how.”  
3. Collaboration Theory 
The homeland security enterprise is wrought with wicked problems, and as noted 
in Megacommunities (Gerenscer, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008), propose the 
concept of collaboration via the “megacommunity” to address these difficult to solve 
problems. The examination of three organizational collaborative theories and the 
distillation of their components or structures will help frame this narrative’s development 
of improvisational theater as a collaborative organizational theory and offer alternative 
perspectives of how agencies collaborate. 
Eugene Bardach offers an inter-organizational collaborative theory that follows 
the metaphor of construction workers building a home (Bardach, 1998). Bardach 
acknowledges his theory relies on the possibility that there may be hundreds of 
individuals needed to effect the building of inter-organizational collaborative capacity, 
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and that his theory leads to the “possibility, and indeed the probability, of creative, 
purposive, human action (Bardach, 2001, p. 151). 
As a house is built foundation first, then the framing of the walls, then the roof, 
then interior fixtures, so too is Bardach’s Craftsmanship theory. Each component must be 
laid in order to facilitate the collaborative process (Bardach, 1998). Without the 
foundation, the walls cannot be framed. Without walls, the roof cannot be built, and 
without a roof, any interior work will be compromised. For Bardach’s model, the 
foundation consists of the following factors: 
 Creative Opportunity 
 Intellectual Capital 
 Implementation Network 
 Advocacy Group 
 Trust 
 Acceptance of Leadership 
 Communication Network 
The “walls and roof” of this theory are comprised of the factors below: 
 Improved Steering Capacity 
 Operating Subsystem 
 Continuous Learning 





Figure 2.   Bardach’s Craftsmanship Theory Platforms (From Bardach, 1998, p. 274)  
The factors in Bardach’s theory can be applied to the homeland security 
environment, and they are particularly useful during the development interagency 
coordination systems. Table 1 depicts the foundational factors, as they may be applied in 
the homeland security context:  
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Table 1.   Bardach’s Craftsmanship Theory for Homeland Security 
Factor Homeland Security Application 
Creative Opportunity A perceived gap is identified in the nation’s ability to warn 
its citizens of a pending terrorist attack. 
Intellectual Capital Resources of the U.S. Attorney General’s office are 
charged with designing a national terrorist alert system. 
Advocacy Group Homeland security and law enforcement professionals 
around the country recognize and communicate the value of 
such a warning system to the public. 
Trust The new alert system warning level is only raised or 
lowered when credible intelligence dictates, never for 
political reasons. 
Acceptance of Leadership This top-down warning system, which can only be adjusted 
by the President, is acknowledged as effective. 
Communications Network Agencies and organizations within the Intelligence 
Community have mechanisms in place to communicate 
potential triggers to raise or lower the alert level. 
 
Barbara Gray (1985) suggests an approach that focuses on collaborating 
organization’s interdependency on one another. Gray’s model describes three phases of 
collaboration: 
 Problem Setting 
 Direction Setting 
 Structuring 
The Problem Setting phase identifies the problem that has brought the 
collaborative entities together and establishes the reason for entering the collaborative 
space. This phase also allows agencies or organizations to recognize their 
interdependence on one another. The Direction Setting phase is the period in which 
mutually agreed upon goals are established and expectations of the desired outcome are 
communicated. The Structuring phase is used to develop processes and mechanisms for 
 29
inter-organizational communication and decision making. From the homeland security 
perspective, these three phases are often present in the collaborative environment, 
whether during a small incident, large-scale disaster or inter-agency planning initiative. 
An example of the Gray Model applicability to homeland security is depicted in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Gray Model of Collaboration for Homeland Security 
Phase Homeland Security Application 
Problem Setting During a pandemic outbreak, the Governor of a rural state 
recognizes the need to maintain government-sponsored food 
and nutrition programs. Responsibility for these programs 
falls to many state agencies, and additional agencies are 
needed to provide subject matter expertise on the nature of 
the pandemic and logistical support for maintaining these 
programs. 
Direction Setting Stakeholder agencies, including Departments of Health, 
Education, Emergency Management, Aging and Long-Term 
Services, Agriculture, and Children, Youth, & Families 
come together to define the problem (maintaining food 
services to at-risk populations) and the role each agency is to 
play in developing a solution to that problem. Agencies also 
agree upon desired outcomes of this collaborative effort, in 
this case, maintaining current level of service through 
government-sponsored food and nutrition programs and the 
potential need to increase service to meet increased demand 
for these services should the pandemic worsen. 
Structuring Agencies identify representatives, establish communication 
procedures (such as standing meetings, briefings, or 
teleconferences), create a web-based platform for sharing 
information as the pandemic develops, and establishes an 
inclusive decision-making command structure. 
 
Much has been written about the factors that enable or inhibit collaboration. 
Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen, in the development of the Inter-organizational 
Collaborative Capacity model, studied the necessary elements for collaboration and 
barriers to collaboration in great depth. Hocevar et al.’s study was based upon a series of 
questions posed to homeland security professionals and their experiences with 
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collaboration in the preparedness phase of their work (Hocevar et al., 2006). This focus 
on the homeland security enterprise in developing their collaborative capacity model led 
to my selection of their Inter-agency Collaborative Capacity model as a comparison for 
the Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model. 
In her research building upon the research of Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen 
exploring the impact of incentives and requirements for collaboration, Jardine (2010) 
identified some common inhibitors to the collaborative process. These barriers include: 
 Territorialism 
 Competing priorities and objectives 
 Unclear roles and responsibilities 
 Lack of accountability 
 Mistrust 
 Competition for resources 
 Lack of knowledge of a partner’s capabilities 
These barriers are in alignment with some of the observations made by Thomas, 
Hocevar, and Jansen in their 2004 paper that found impediments to collaboration 
included: 
 
 Divergent goals  
 Focus on local organization over cross-agency (e.g., regional) concerns  
 Lack of goal clarity  
 Not adaptable to interests of other organizations  
 Impeding rules or policies  
 Inadequate authority of participants  
 Inadequate resources  
 Lack of accountability  
 Lack of formal roles or procedures for managing collaboration  
 Lack of familiarity with other organizations  
 Inadequate communication and information sharing (distrust)  
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 Competition for resources  
 Territoriality  
 Organization-level distrust  
 Lack of mutual respect  
 Apathy  
 Lack of competency  
 Arrogance, hostility, animosity  
Conversely, the research by Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen (2006) found the 
following to be contributing factors to collaboration: 
 “Felt need” to collaborate 
 Common goal 
 Willingness to address other agency’s interests or cross-agency goals 
 versus local organizational goals 
 Formalized structure for coordination (e.g., committee or liaison roles) 
 Formalized processes (meetings, deadlines, agendas) 
 Sufficient authority of participants 
 Role clarity 
 Dedicated assets (people, resources) for collaboration 
 Social Capital (i.e., interpersonal networks) 
 Effective communication and information exchange 
 Technical interoperability 
 Combined training events 
 Collaboration as a prerequisite for funding or resources 
 Respect for other parties’ interests, expertise, roles, and perspectives. 
 Perseverance/Commitment 
Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen have defined their Inter-organizational 
Collaborative Capacity model as “the capability of organizations (or a set of 
organizations) to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit  
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of collective outcomes” (Jansen et al., 2008). This framework also serves as a conceptual 
model to identify obstacles and enablers to the collaborative process (Martin, 2010).  
This model provides five domains through which an organization’s collaborative 
capacity can be assessed. The model can also serve as a guidepost of an agency or 
organization’s efforts to improve its capacity to collaborate. Additionally, there are 
thirteen factors distributed throughout the five domains providing further assessment of 
collaborative capacity. 
The “Purpose and Strategy” domain refers to an organization’s ability to 
recognize its interdependence among other agencies and organizations, and its 
acknowledgement of the need to collaborate in order to achieve its goals and objectives. 
This domain also refers to the strategic importance an agency or organization’s leadership 
places on collaboration and the commitment of resources to the collaborative process 
(Hocevar et al 2011). This domain stresses the importance of an organizational culture 
that accepts and contributes to the notion of shared power, ideas, goals and objectives 
(Jardine, 2010). 
The “Rewards Systems” domain seeks out opportunities for financial, resource, or 
promotional incentives offered for collaboration, or the need for evidence of 
collaboration to receive grant funding (Hocevar et al., 2006, 2011). This domain supposes 
that the use of mandates or incentives can be used to increase collaboration in instances 
where collaborative capacity is otherwise lacking (Jardine, 2010). 
The “Structure” domain considers the presence of liaisons, interagency teams and 
task forces, or other formal structures to facilitate the collaborative process. This domain 
includes the need for flexibility within those structures, performance standards and 
established criteria to evaluate interagency collaboration, and the existence of goals, 
constraints, and authorities for individual collaborative efforts (Hocevar, 2011). Jardine 
(2010) describes the support of leadership as an important factor in this domain.  
The “Lateral Process” domain is comprised of what Hocevar et al. refer to as 
“hard” and “soft” aspects of lateral coordination (2011). The positive, interpersonal 
relationships that foster trust, open communication and information sharing lead to the 
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development of social capital, a major component of this domain (Jardine, 2010). 
Professional and social relationships, technology like email, video conferencing, and 
web-based planning platforms, the importance organizations place on information 
sharing, and collaborative learning like inter-agency training and multi-agency exercises 
comprise this domain (Hocevar et al., 2011). Institutionalize relationships like 
governance structures, mutual aid agreements and operational procedures also fall under 
this domain (Jardine, 2010). 
The fifth domain, “People,” refers exclusively to the collaborative ability of 
individual members of organizations. Conflict management skills, a willingness to share 
ideas and knowledge and understanding of how their organization operates in conjunction 
with respect for the expertise brought to bear by those in collaborative partner 
organizations are factors of this domain (Hocevar et al., 2011).  
Table 3 illustrates the applicability of the Inter-organizational Collaborative 
Capacity model to homeland security: 
Table 3.   Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model for Homeland Security 
Domain Homeland Security Application 
Purpose and Strategy During a large wild fire, a small jurisdiction quickly 
becomes overwhelmed, requiring additional resources to 
meet the incident objectives. 
Reward System As a condition of grant funding, surrounding jurisdictions 
make their equipment and personnel available for 
firefighting operations. 
Structure The existing intra-state mutual aid system allows resources 
to be tracked and documented as the move from providing 
jurisdiction to the impacted jurisdiction. 
Lateral Process The impacted jurisdiction allows incident command team 
trainees to shadow their personnel on the fire, gaining 
valuable experience and increasing future capacity to 
manage such large events within the region. 
People Pre-incident inter-agency and inter-jurisdictional planning, 
training, and exercises have created strong relationships 
between the individuals within the collaborating agencies. 
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B. SOME COLLABORATION UNKNOWNS 
As important to my narrative as what is known about collaboration is what is not 
known. The unknown I am most concerned with as a storyteller is the plausibility of my 
narrative. Since my story is about the solving a homeland security problem through 
application of the principles of improvisational theater to multi-agency collaboration, 
needed to discover if that narrative already been told? If it has not, why not? If it has, did 
the narrative make any sense? Based upon the body of literature examined for this 
narrative, I have determined parts of this narrative can be found in other stories, but it has 
not yet been put together in the way I am proposing. Models have been applied to 
collaboration, homeland security has been described as a collaborative process, and 
improvisational theater performers and teachers recognize the collaborative nature of 
their work. But the narrative of transforming the collaborative principles of 
improvisational theater into a model, which is then applied to homeland security, has not 
yet been told. 
The Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity model offers a strategy for 
developing collaborative capacity within the homeland security enterprise, and the 
model’s use of five domains of collaboration provide some direction for the homeland 
security practitioner to increase the collaborative capacity of their organization (Hocevar 
et al., 2006). This paper seeks to add to the “how to collaborate” literature through the 
introduction of a collaborative model based upon the principles of improvisational 
theater.  
C. IMPROVISATIONAL THEATER 
1. About Improvisational Theater Performance 
Frank J. Barrett’s 1998 paper, “Creativity and Improvisation in Jazz and 
Organizations: Implications for organizational Learning,” suggests jazz improvisation 
exemplifies organizations designed for learning and improvisation. Barrett outlines seven 
characteristics of jazz bands that allow them to do what managers of organizations often 
do: invent paths forward without prior knowledge of the outcome and realizing the 
outcome only as it reveals itself (Barrett, p. 605). Improvisation, whether performed by 
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actors or a jazz trio as Barrett describes, “represents the human capacity to think freshly, 
to generate novel solutions, (and) to create something new and interesting” (Barrett,  
p. 620). This paper follows Barrett’s lead but looks at the world of improvisational 
theater, as opposed to improvisational jazz, to find components that can be applied to 
homeland security organizational collaboration. 
Improvisation as a theatrical performance style can trace its roots back to the 
Commedia Dell'Arte, a popular form of theater begun in Italy performed throughout 
Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Performers would perform entire 
plays through improvisation. Like today’s improvised theater, the performers would be 
given a scenario to guide their performance (Hartnoll, 1985). Unlike today’s 
improvisational theater, Commedia actors would generally portray the same character 
throughout their career and would wear masks associated with that character. Commedia 
Dell’arte as a performance style was perhaps best documented at the time by Andrea 
Perrucci, a Sicilian lawyer who penned Dell’arte Rappresejtatva (The Art of Staging 
Plays, Premeditated and Improvised), in which much of the text is devoted to his belief 
that improvisation is superior to other acting styles (Brown, 1997). Commedia is said to 
have influenced the work of William Shakespeare, Molière, puppets Punch and Judy and 
twentieth century performers like Charlie Chaplin and the Keystone Cops (Hartnoll, 
1985). The idea of a narrative set around a basic plot idea with no set dialogue 
established the framework used but the United States’ first improvisational theater, The 
Compass (Fotis, 2005). 
Improvisation as a performance style in the United States was first developed in 
the United States by Paul Sills and David Shepherd who co-founded The Compass 
Theater in Chicago in the mid-1950s (Spolin, 1999). This theater was built around the 
work of two sisters, Neva Boyd and Viola Spolin, and their use begun in 1938, of games, 
story-telling and drama to spark creativity in children and adults through the Works 
Progress Administration’s recreational Training School, also in Chicago. These games 
were originally designed as a tool to teach drama to lower-income children in Chicago’s 
West Side (Coleman, 1990). This work laid the foundation for the Young Actors 
Company in Hollywood, California, where these games were used as rehearsal tools 
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during the development of plays (Spolin, 1999). About the same time Sills and Shepherd 
were working on the Compass Theater in Chicago, Keith Johnstone was simultaneously, 
and unknowingly, developing a similar style of performance in England (Johnstone, 
1979). 
Improvisational theater has been defined as “A form of unscripted performance 
that uses audience suggestions to initiate or shape scenes or plays created spontaneously 
and cooperatively according to agreed-upon rules or game structures, in the presence of 
an audience—frequently resulting in comedy” (Seham, 1997). While this definition is not 
comprehensive, nor does it describe every type of improvisational theater performance, 
this definition accurately describes how improvisation is generally practiced in the United 
States, and the style of improvisation most often performed.  
Improvisational theater requires a performer to listen to what is being said by his 
or her fellow players, observe what they are doing, as often times props are created 
through pantomime, and they must remain flexible, as preconceived narratives are 
derailed as soon as another player does or says something that is not part of the imagined 
“script.” While improvisation can often lead to humorous scenes and situation, it is not 
necessarily a comedic genre. Improvisation is not necessarily intended to be comedic, but 
rather, a collaborative story-telling effort that is generated through the input of each 
player. 
2. Improvisational Theater Theory 
Spolin, Sills, and Johnstone each use games as a way to introduce and develop the 
improvisational skills of performers. Since an improviser cannot rehearse a performance 
the way a scripted theater performer can (learning lines of dialogue, entrance and exit 
cues, etc.), the director can instead coach the improvisers through rehearsal periods 
through theater games, reinforcing the principles of improvisational theater. Much of the 
literature about improvisation is written for the improvisational performer, not for a 
scholarly analysis of the style. This literature, however, is useful in distilling the theories 
of some of the leading improvisational theater practitioners. 
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In her book “Improvisation for the Theater,” Viola Spolin begins by saying 
“everyone can improvise.” This premise has been the centerpiece to her approach to 
improvisation and the development of theater games, improvised exercises originally 
intended to help rehearse scripted theater performances. Although Spolin avoids the term 
“rules” when instructing on the implementation of improvisation as a rehearsal tool, she 
does offer several “reminders and pointers.” Among these “pointers” are: 
 Be flexible  
 Any player who “steals” a scene is a thief 
 Any player who feels urgent about a game and plays it alone does not trust 
 his fellow players 
 No one player can decide that a scene (game) is ended 
 When players are always alerted and willing to come to each other’s aid as 
 needed, each member of the cast is given a sense of security 
 Without the other player, there is no game 
 No one knows the outcome of a game until one plays it 
 Scene improvisation can only evolve out of group agreement and playing 
Since the original intent of these improvisational games was for use during 
rehearsal, Spolin, and later, Sills, rely heavily on side-coaching during these games. Side-
coaching terms like “give and take” can remind the improviser to be aware and inclusive 
of the other performers, and comments like “No playwrighting” reminds the improviser 
to allow the narrative to emerge from what is being presented. 
Keith Johnstone’s book Imrpo (1979) includes three chapters dealing specifically 
with his approach to improvisation: Status; Spontaneity; and Narrative Skills.  
Johnstone’s chapter on Status delves into the importance of relationships, and the 
status of one player, or character, to another. Examples Johnstone provides of status in 
relationships include master and servant, wealthy and poor, knowledgeable and ignorant. 
Understanding the dynamics of status within a relationship, Johnstone states, is critical as 
this “pecking order” affects even the smallest details of our behavior. This idea about 
relationships and status, especially in the realm of improvisation, speaks to the notion of 
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being changed, in some way, by what has been presented. If in an improvisation, an actor 
refers to someone as “your majesty,” the improviser referred to as “your majesty” must 
then alter any preconceived ideas about where the scene may have been headed, and 
embrace being majestic.  
In his discussion about spontaneity, Johnstone links creative impulses to the 
spontaneity necessary for improvisation. Johnstone cites an exercise he has used in class 
to foster spontaneity and mitigate self-censorship wherein a student is asked to imagine a 
box, and then asked, what is inside the imagined box. Hesitation, Johnstone notes, is 
often evident and indicative of someone not allowing themselves to be spontaneous and 
instead, censoring their first thought or instinctive answer. Johnstone also refers to 
blocking, or saying “No,” as a form of aggression and an artificial injection of conflict 
into a scene. More ideas and increased spontaneity occurs, if ideas are accepted. 
Johnstone believes this leads to the impression that improvisers have planned what it is 
they are going to do, when in fact they have not. 
The narrative, or story, of the improvisational performance, can fall into many 
traps, if any of the concepts mentioned previously are not followed. Johnstone describes 
an improviser as someone walking forward while facing backwards. The improviser must 
be able to see what action has occurred in the past but must always be moving into new 
space, or continue to allow the narrative to progress, not regress. Speaking to the 
collaborative nature of improvisation, Johnstone says, “Anyone who tries to control the 
future of the story can only succeed in ruining it.” Allowing the narrative to emerge 
organically from the words and actions of each player, and to keep the narrative moving 
forward, is the only way to achieve a truly improvised story. 
One of the research questions in Chapter I asked, “Are the principles of 
improvisation fairly consistent among the leading improvisational theater practitioners?” 
The writings and teachings of Keith Johnstone, Viola Spolin, and Paul Sills, although 
phrasing their improvisational philosophies differently, all espouse the same basic 
principles: Progress the narrative or action, accept offers by saying “yes,” do not ignore 




Among the vast body of literature that has been written about inter-agency 
collaboration are policies, doctrine and directives from the federal government mandating 
collaboration within the homeland security enterprise. Researchers have also explored 
theories of inter-organizational collaboration, and this paper examined several, focusing 
most closely on the work of Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen and their Inter-organizational 
Collaborative Capacity model, as it was developed utilizing homeland security 
professionals as research subjects.  
The importance of collaboration to the homeland security enterprise, though well 
documented in policy, extends beyond federal mandates and lies instead with the 
understanding by those operating within homeland security environment that many of the 
wicked problems faced by the enterprise cannot be solved by a single agency.  
Improvisational theater, when viewed as an unscripted style of storytelling, offers 
well-established guiding principles that improvisational theater performers adhere to 
when crafting a narrative. Transposing these principles onto the homeland security 
enterprise, and applying these principles as if each agency or organization within a 
homeland security collaborative space were a performer in an improvised scene, offers a 
model for homeland security practitioners to collaborate in the multi-agency, multi-
jurisdictional environment that often defines homeland security and may be necessary to 
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III. DATA 
Don’t find a fault. Find a remedy.  
–Henry Ford 
 
Multi-agency collaborative efforts can be difficult to quantify. How many 
agencies or organizations participated in collaborative meetings or discussions can 
certainly provide a number, but it does not speak to the efficacy of the collaboration. As 
J. E. Obrien noted in his paper, Essential Elements for Preparedness Planning, “The fact 
that people are meeting together does not necessarily indicate that collaboration is 
occurring” (2006, p. 28). It is important to determine whether or not the right agencies or 
representatives involved. Did any agency, organization, or jurisdiction not sit at the table 
that should have? Did the collaboration lead to a decision or was the decision made prior 
to the establishment of the collaborative space? Some of the most useful data pertaining 
to collaboration and the answers to the previous questions in a homeland security 
environment can probably be found within incident reports and after action reviews. The 
analysis of after-action reports through the application of two collaboration models will 
demonstrate the applicability of these models to multi-agency collaboration, and the 
utility of both models. 
A. ABOUT INCIDENT REPORTS AND AFTER ACTION REVIEWS 
This data, culled from incident reports and after-action documents, come from 
four sources, with each source drawing from media reports, interviews, and 
communications during the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Two of the reports comprising 
the data set were generated by, or at the behest of, the United States federal government. 
These are the On Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill by the United 
States Coast Guard, and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Incident Specific 
Preparedness Review, a collaborative effort in itself, drafted through a partnership among 
several federal and state agencies. The third report used in this data set is the after-action 
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review report/improvement plan created by the Florida State Emergency Response Team 
(SERT), Deepwater Horizon Response.  
After-action reviews as a performance analysis tool can follow their roots back to 
the oral histories provided by soldiers following their engagement in combat. Journalist 
and historian S. L. A. Marshall conducted these “interviews after combat,” where 
questions meant to reconstruct battles from memory were asked to soldiers involved in 
those battles. This practice continued through the Korean Conflict and war in Vietnam 
(Morrison & Meliza, pp. 5–6). These oral histories evolved into performance critiques 
developed by the U.S. Army to obtain feedback from exercises through the 1960s, and 
evaluated outcomes of simulated battles (Morrison & Meliza, p. 6). The subjectivity and, 
at times, negative tone of some performance critiques, the U.S. Army combined the 
approach of Marshall with a less-negative performance critiques to create the Tactical 
Engagement Simulation to provide more objective feedback to soldiers. This method 
became known as the After Action Review (Morrison & Meliza, p. 7). The After Action 
Review continues to be used and refined by the U.S. Army (Mastaglo et al., p. 1), which 
released the Leader’s Guide to After Action Reviews in 1993 (U.S. Army, 1993). 
After-action reports generally seek to answer three questions: 1) What worked 
well?  2) Where were the gaps? and 3) What can be done differently in the future to 
improve performance? (Kaliner, p. 14). Incident reports follow a similar construct to 
after-action reviews, and therefore are included as data for analysis of collaboration in the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster. Over the past ten or so years, the U.S. government has 
formed several commissions to examine disasters, provide an accounting of the event, 
and suggest recommendations based upon their findings. Perhaps most notable in recent 
history are the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States and the Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. In the 9/11 Commission Report’s 
preface, co-chairs Hamilton and Kean say that their “…aim has not been to assign 
individual blame. Our aim has been to provide the fullest accounting of the events 
surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned” (National Commission, 2004). 
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Similarly, the Hurricane Katrina Commission’s report A Failure of Initiative stated in its 
preface, 
The Select Committee has spent much of the past five months examining 
the aftermath of this catastrophic disaster. It has become increasingly clear 
that local, state, and federal government agencies failed to meet the needs 
of the residents of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. It has been our 
job to figure out why, and to make sure we are better prepared for the 
future. 
Our mandate was clear: Gather facts about the preparation for and 
response to Katrina, at all levels of government. 
Investigate aggressively, follow the facts wherever they may lead, and find 
out what went right and what went wrong. Ask why coordination and 
information sharing between local, state, and federal governments was so 
dismal. (Hurricane Katrina Commission, 2006) 
Although the Katrina Commission appears to be targeting government across all 
levels, the goal of each report was less to assign blame and more to prevent repetition of 
problems or gaps during similar incidents. That is the function of the after action review 
and the three additional reports used to provide the data that will be analyzed for 
collaborative occurrences and opportunities during the Deepwater Horizon disaster.  
B. WHY DEEPWATER HORIZON? 
The explosion, fire and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling unit and 
subsequent massive oil release at the Macondo oil well in the Gulf of Mexico off the 
Louisiana coast is as unique of a disaster as any that has occurred in the United States. 
This disaster was selected as a case study for examination into the applicability of 
improvisational theater principles to multi-agency coordination for several reasons. This 
disaster started as a very localized incident, limited to less than a square mile of sea. 
Within a matter of days, however, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida 
were feeling the effects of the disaster via oil washing up on their shores, and some 
modeling showed the oil spreading up the eastern seaboard towards New York and 
Canada and impacting island nations in the Caribbean Sea as well (UCAR, 2010). 
Although 11 lives were lost and 17 rig workers were injured during the Deepwater 
Horizon (Deepwater Horizon Commission Report, p. 191), the greatest impacts of this 
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disaster were economic and environmental, costing billions of dollars to tourism and 
commercial fishing operations, and impacting coastal ecosystems from Louisiana to 
Florida along the Gulf Coast (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 2010). The public safety impacts 
of this disaster were secondary to the economic damages. 
The importance of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy to my narrative, however, lies 
primarily in the unprecedented coordination and collaboration required for the response 
and recovery for this disaster. This disaster was the result of private sector activities, 
activities for which the federal government had oversight. The federal government was 
responsible for managing the response and recovery efforts associated with the disaster 
(not the same agency that had regulatory oversight- the Department of Interior’s Minerals 
Management Service, but the Department of Homeland Security’s United States Coast 
Guard) (Deepwater Horizon Commission Report, p. 65). Although the federal 
government was responsible for the recovery, most of the equipment and technology 
needed for the recovery and clean-up efforts belonged to private sector entities. The 
spread of oil from the blown-out well in the Gulf of Mexico eventually reached the 
United States, impacting state, tribal and local governments across four of the states 
bordering the Gulf. The financial hardships felt by those who made a living from the Gulf 
of Mexico, either through commercial fishing or shrimping operations or tourism, were 
severe. In many cases, these businesses and individuals relied upon assistance from 
private, nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations to mitigate the consequences the 
disaster had on their livelihood.  
In addition to the multiple levels of government and private sector involvement, 
this disaster, which began on April 20, 2010 (Deepwater Horizon Commission Report, p. 
xiii), did not cease response operations until October 1, 2010, 131 days after the initial 
explosion (Deepwater Horizon Commission Report, p. 170). The huge geographical area 
of this disaster, the economic and environmental impact, and the necessary coordination 
among local, state, federal and private sector organizations and agencies makes this 
incident a unique example of multi-agency coordination and is illustrative of the need for 
collaboration during a disaster. 
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C. DEEPWATER HORIZON REVIEW 
The tragedy of the deepwater horizon, from the days leading up to the disaster as 
the well was being drilled to the ongoing recovery efforts, have been well documented in 
official government reports, media accounts and personal stories. The multiple facets of 
this story, the plot turns, characters, conflicts and climax are too numerous to detail here. 
However, to frame this tragedy as a case study in collaboration, a familiarity of the nature 
of this disaster, how it unfolded, and some key narrative elements are necessary. The 
following timeline depicts the major events and milestones in the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster at the Macondo well site in the Gulf of Mexico as documented in the U.S. Coast 
Guard’s On-scene Coordinator Report: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (2011). 
 April 20, 2010: At approximately 10:00 pm local time, an explosion 
occurs aboard the Deepwater Horizon well drilling unit. 
 April 20, 2012: Moments after the explosion, the United States Coast 
Guard District 8 Command Center in Louisiana is notified of the incident, 
and a search and rescue mission is launched. 
 April 21, 2012: 115 of the 126 workers on board the Deepwater Horizon at 
the time of the explosion have been accounted for, many are injured and 
receiving treatment in hospitals. The drilling unit continues to burn, and 
begins to list in the water. 
 April 22, 2010: Dispersants begin being used to for the first time on crude 
oil leading from the Macondo well as the Deepwater Horizon drilling unit 
sinks. 
 April 23, 2010: A Unified Area Command is established in Robert, 
Louisiana with an Incident Command Post (ICP) in Houma, Louisiana. At 
5:00 pm the U.S. Coast Guard suspends its search for survivors. Survivors 
place the eleven missing workers near the scene of the explosion. 
 April 24, 2010: A second Incident Command Post is established in 
Houston, Texas and a Joint Information Center (JIC) is established by the 
U.S. Coast Guard in Robert, Louisiana. 
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 April 25, 2010: British Petroleum activates a twenty-four hour telephone 
information hotline and establishes two claims offices to begin 
compensation efforts. 
 April 26, 2010: A third Incident Command Post is added to the Unified 
Area Command, operating out of Mobile, Alabama. The Department of 
Energy begins to monitor British Petroleum’s response efforts. 
 April 27, 2010: Containment boom begins being laid along coastal areas 
of Florida and Louisiana. 
 April 28, 2010: British Petroleum is named a Responsible Party (RP) for 
this spill by the U.S. Coast Guard and the National Pollution Funds Center 
(NPFC). 
 April 29, 2010: Deepwater Horizon declared a Spill of National 
Significance (SONS) and a National Incident Command (NIC) is 
established. The Governor of Louisiana declares a State of Emergency. 
 April 30, 2010: Governors of Alabama, Mississippi and Florida each 
declare a State of Emergency. 
 May 1, 2010: Commandant Admiral Thad Allen of the U.S. Coast Guard 
is named National Incident Commander. 
 May 6, 2010: The first oil traced to the Macondo well to reach land is 
found on the shores of the Chandeleur Islands off the Louisiana coast. 
 May 6–8, 2010: Attempts to place a containment dome known as a coffer 
dam over the well are unsuccessful. 
 May 11, 2010: The Louisiana National Guard applies to the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers for permission to build six sand berms to protect the 
Louisiana coast. Secretary Salazar of the Department of the Interior 
announces the restructuring of the Minerals Management Service (MMS) 
to create independent environmental oversight and safety entities. 
 May 12, 2010: British Petroleum, determined to be the Responsible Party, 
releases 30 seconds of underwater video showing oil flowing from the 
ruptured Macondo well. 
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 May 15, 2010: Secretaries of the Department of Homeland Security and 
Department of Interior both sign a letter to British Petroleum’s Chief 
Executive Officer notifying him that BP is responsible for the full clean-
up of the Deepwater Horizon disaster and any economic loss caused by the 
spill. 
 May 19, 2010: U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Environment 
subcommittee demands British Petroleum begin a publicly-available live-
stream video broadcast of the undersea leaks. 
 May 20, 2010: British Petroleum begins a 24-hour live-stream video of the 
leak that is accessible to the public over the internet. 
 May 22, 2010: President Obama establishes the National Commission on 
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling to make 
recommendations for the prevention and mitigation of future oil spills 
resulting from offshore drilling operations. 
 May 24, 2010: The Department of Commerce declares a fisheries disaster 
and closes nineteen percent of the Gulf of Mexico to commercial and 
recreational fishing. 
 May 25, 2010: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers grants approval for a 
portion of the Louisiana National Guard’s berm construction request. 
 May 26, 2010: The Environmental Protection Agency orders a reduction 
in the use of chemical dispersants. British Petroleum also attempts a “top 
kill” process to stop the flow of oil from the ruptured well. After the third 
unsuccessful attempt, this strategy is abandoned. 
 May 27, 2010: Flow rates from the Macondo well are estimated between 
12,000 barrels and 19,000 barrels per day, up from initial estimates of 
1,000 barrels per day. 
 May 29, 2010: British Petroleum begins developing plans to install a “top 
hat” collection structure over the ruptured well to collect leaking oil. 
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 May 31, 2010: The fisheries closure boundary is extended, closing 61,854 
square miles, or twenty-five percent of the Gulf of Mexico, to commercial 
and recreational fishing. 
 June 1, 2010: The fisheries closure is extended to thirty-one percent of the 
Gulf of Mexico. 
 June 3, 2010: The “top hat” is installed and begins collecting oil and 
siphoning it to a containment vessel at the surface. 
 June 4, 2010: Oil from the Macondo well in the form of tar balls are 
discovered on Florida’s gulf coast beaches. 
 June 16, 2010: A specialize oil response vessel, the Q4000, begins 
operations, processing and burning up to 10,000 barrels of oil per day. 
 June 18, 2010: The Unified Area Command moves from Robert, 
Louisiana to New Orleans, Louisiana. 
 June 28, 2010: Thirty-eight percent of the Gulf of Mexico is now closed to 
commercial and recreational fishing. 
 July 9, 2010: An Incident Command Post is established in Galveston, 
Texas. 
 July 12, 2010: A capping stack is installed over the leaking well, the first 
step in permanently sealing the Macondo well site. 
 July 15, 2010: The capping stack is closed, stopping the flow of oil into 
the Gulf of Mexico. 
 July 22, 2010: Tropical Storm Bonnie enters the Gulf of Mexico, 
temporarily suspending response operations. Portions of the fisheries 
closure begin to reopen. 
 August 3, 2010: A static kill of the well is successful, permanently sealing 
the well with concrete.  
 August, 2010: Throughout the month, relief wells are drilled to relieve 
pressure on the sealed opening of the Macondo well. 
 September 7, 2010: Aerial inspection confirms all containment boom has 
been removed from the coasts of Alabama, Mississippi and Florida. 
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 September 19, 2010: The combination of the static kill and the 
effectiveness of the relief wells lead the National Incident Commander to 
determine the well is effectively sealed. 
 September 20, 2010: The three Incident Command Posts are consolidated 
under the Gulf Coast Incident Management Team operating out of New 
Orleans, Louisiana. 
 October 1, 2010: National Incident Command is terminated. 
 December 1, 2010: The Unified Area Command transfers command of the 
incident to the Gulf Coast Incident Management Team in New Orleans. 
D. SUMMARY 
The data used for this comparative analysis comes from multiple Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill disaster sources, primarily government reports and after-action review 
documents. While this data is somewhat subjective, in that it was compiled and 
documented through individual observations of the disaster, it provides a consistent data 
set to which the two collaborative models can be applied.  
The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill disaster provides a case study of homeland 
security collaboration unequalled in the history of the United States in terms of the 
volume of response and coordination agencies, public sector and private sector 
engagement, length of response operations, and geographical impact.  
By the end of 2010, more than 827,000 barrels of oil had been recovered, 47,000 
responders were deployed, dozens of federal, state, local and tribal agencies were 
represented at locations throughout the Gulf of Mexico, dozens more private sector 
organizations were represented at the incident, 6,870 vessels, including barges, tugs, 
skimmers, and tankers, were utilized, 4,1200,000 feet of containment boom was placed to 
protect the coastline, 17,500 Louisiana National Guard troops were on orders for the 
response efforts, and eleven workers aboard the Deepwater Horizon lost their lives. 
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IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COLLABORATION AND 
DEEPWATER HORIZON 
I always tried to turn every disaster into an opportunity.  
–John D. Rockefeller 
 
This disaster can be viewed through a variety of lenses, but for a story that is 
driven by collaboration and the problems agencies can have functioning within a 
collaborative environment, the lenses of improvisational theater principles and the Inter-
organizational Collaborative Capacity model are the appropriate. It is important that I 
remind the reader of this narrative that one lens is not necessarily better, more useful, or 
more accurate through which collaboration can be viewed than the other. Rather, one lens 
is more widely accepted within the homeland security enterprise, and one lens is entirely 
unknown within the homeland security enterprise and, perhaps disruptive. However, the 
homeland security enterprise has benefited from innovation in the past, and continues to 
benefit from innovation. The analysis of the case study below, or rather, viewing the 
Deepwater Horizon tragedy through both lenses, provides examples of the Inter-agency 
Collaborative Capacity Model domains, as well as the Improvisational Theater 
Collaboration Model principles in the context of a real-world incident, demonstrating the 
utility of both models, and the collaborative innovation proposed in this thesis.  
A. THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER AND THE INTER-
ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY MODEL 
This section will examine specific observations from the Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill disaster, as documented in after action reviews and government reports. These 
observations will point to instances where a problem occurred, a decision was made 
within the collaborative domain to address that problem, and collaborative elements of 
the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity model were applied and the problem was 
successfully nullified through collaboration. Similarly, instances where a problem could 
have been more effectively addressed through a collaborative process had the elements of 
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the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity model were applied been applied in those 
situations. 
1. Domain: Purpose and Strategy 
The “Purpose and Strategy” domain refers to an organization’s ability to 
recognize its interdependence among other agencies and organizations, and its 
acknowledgement of the need to collaborate in order to achieve its goals and objectives.  
a. Observation: Lack of Local Integration into Operations (Florida, 
2011) 
Although local jurisdictions are normally at the forefront of disaster 
response in Florida, this was not the case with the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill disaster. 
Having a private-sector organization, in this case, British Petroleum, coordinating the 
response was unchartered territory for local jurisdictions in Florida. The flow of 
information from BP to impacted (or potentially impacted) local jurisdiction was 
determined to be insufficient and command and control decisions were not being made at 
the local level, as is typically the case for disasters more common to Florida like 
hurricanes (Florida, 2011, p. 30). 
b. Analysis 
The need to collaborate has been identified as a factor within the Purpose 
and Strategy domain by Hovecar et al. This domain is also marked by strategic 
collaboration and a willingness to address other agency’s interests or goals. Although 
local governments displayed a desire for integration into the operational planning for the 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill as the disaster began to impact Florida, BP did not 
demonstrate the same desire to collaborate or recognize the benefits of strategic 
collaboration with local governments in Florida to facilitate a more effective response. 
Although both BP and local governments in Florida were presumably working towards 
the common goal of protecting against environmental and economic impacts of the 
disaster, BP was not able to place the interests of Florida’s local governments (providing 
information to businesses and residents within their jurisdictions) ahead of, or even in 
 53
line with, its goals. Eventually, county governments in Florida were included in BP and 
the U.S. Coast Guard’s operational decision-making process. Perhaps, if by focusing on 
the factors within the Purpose and Strategy domain and recognizing the need for strategic 
collaboration and sharing goals, resources, and ideas, local jurisdictions in Florida would 
have been brought into the decision-making process earlier in the incident response.  
2. Domain: Structure 
The “Structure” domain considers the presence of liaisons, interagency teams and 
task forces, or other formal structures to facilitate the collaborative process. This domain 
includes the need for flexibility within those structures, performance standards and 
established criteria to evaluate interagency collaboration, and the existence of goals, 
constraints, and authorities for individual collaborative efforts.  
a. Observation: The Unified Command Mobile Provided a 
Command Structure That was too Large and too Complex 
(Florida, 2011) 
Unified Command Mobile (AL) was established six days after the initial 
explosion at the Macondo well site, and followed the establishment of Incident Command 
Posts in Houston, Texas and Houma, Louisiana. UC Mobile was the command center for 
coordinating the response in Alabama, Mississippi and Florida. The volume of people, 
many of who were oil spill response contractors, led to competition among the three 
states for limited resources and difficulty maintaining command and control. The number 
of personnel working at UC Mobile also caused unnecessary redundancies, which led to 
breakdowns in messaging. UC Mobile became a revolving door for personnel from 
different jurisdictions, agencies and sectors, and this turnover greatly inhibited decision-
making (Florida, 2011 p. 28). 
b. Analysis 
To address the problematic command and control issues associated with 
the enormous volume of personnel operating at UC Mobile, the Florida SERT found 
itself addressing this problem through the Structure domain of the Inter-organizational 
Collaborative Capacity model. The Structure domain calls for a formalized coordination 
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structure via committees, task forces, or liaisons and a formalized collaborative process. 
Dedicated assets and role clarity can also support the structural flexibility factor within 
this domain. Florida SERT embedded their forward team into established sections of the 
UC, which helped establish relationships and facilitating the use of liaisons between the 
UC and the Florida SEOC. Before the decision to embed the forward team into 
established sections, the forward team was relegated to tables outside of the operational 
work area, creating insulation around the forward team and creating barriers to 
communication. Clarifying the role of the Florida Forward SERT and including a 
representative from the forward team in the incident command structure and the forward 
team’s engagement in the formal collaborative process (planning meetings, etc.) 
improved the level of cooperation for the Florida SERT at UC Mobile. 
3. Domain: Lateral Processes 
The “Lateral Process” domain is comprised of what Hocevar et al. refer to as 
“hard” and “soft” aspects of lateral coordination. The positive, interpersonal relationships 
that foster trust, open communication and information sharing lead to the development of 
social capital, a major component of this domain.  
a. Observation: The Need for Real-time Document and Information 
Sharing (Florida, 2011) 
A number of Florida State Emergency Response Team Members operated 
at various locations outside of the State Emergency Operations Center. This provided a 
challenge in real-time information and document sharing between personnel located in 
the SEOC and those operating in field locations or Unified Command Mobile. To address 
the need to share documents in real time, while providing some personnel read-only 
access and others editing/writing access as well, all on an interoperable platform, the 
Florida SERT utilized Google Docs, a free, open-source, off-the-shelf product to share 
and edit documents in real time from multiple locations (Florida, 2011 p. 16). 
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b. Analysis 
The ability to exchange information and effectively communicate falls 
within the Lateral Mechanism domain of the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity 
model. This domain, which includes information sharing and collaborative learning as 
factors recognizes the technological needs, in addition to interpersonal networks, 
necessary to facilitate collaboration. The Florida SERT recognition of the need to 
develop, share, and edit incident-specific documents like ICS 213 forms requesting 
resources and leverage existing technology to address that need offers an example of 
facilitating collaboration within the Lateral Process domain of the Inter-organizational 
Collaborative Capacity model.  
4. Domain: Reward Systems 
The “Reward Systems” domain seeks out opportunities for financial, resource, or 
promotional incentives offered for collaboration, or the need for evidence of 
collaboration to receive grant funding. 
a. Observation: Multiple Incident Action Plans Throughout the 
Unified Area Command (USCG-September, 2011) 
Due to the time commitment required to complete an incident-wide 
Incident Action Plan, some supporting agencies began developing their own IAP to 
outline their goals, objectives and resource needs for their operations. This led to 
duplicative resource orders, and the purchase of resources that were already available to 
the incident’s operations. A single IAP was eventually agreed upon, due in part to 
funding requirements under the Pollution Removal Funding Authorizations (USCG-
September, 2011, p. 16). 
b. Analysis 
The U.S. Coast Guard was finally able to consolidate the incident action 
planning of all entities involved in the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill response, in large 
part due to the funding requirements under the Pollution Removal Funding 
Authorizations. The Incentive domain of the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity 
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model references incentives or rewards ties to collaboration. The mandate of a single IAP 
in order to procure resources through the Pollution Removal Funding Authorizations is an 
example of the creation of incentives to facilitate collaboration. While it may appear to 
punish noncollaborative behavior, it also rewards collaboration. By offering this funding 
incentive, agencies and organizations recognized a benefit that outweighed the drawbacks 
of a cumbersome process and began operating off of a single IAP. 
5. Domain: People 
The “People” domain refers to the collaborative ability of individual members of 
organizations. Conflict management skills, a willingness to share ideas and knowledge 
and understanding of how their organization operates in conjunction with respect for the 
expertise brought to bear by those in collaborative partner organizations are factors of 
this domain. 
a. Observation: The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security Serving as Principle Federal Officer (PFO) as Outlined 
in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) 
(USCG-January, 2011 p. 62)  
The 2002 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) 
establishes the Secretary of Homeland Security as the Principle Federal Officer (PFO) for 
all natural or man-made disasters and emergency planning. Although most federal 
agencies understood the role of the DHS Secretary, in this case, Secretary Janet 
Napolitano as the PFO, the media and public seemed confused about who, from the 
federal government, was “in charge” USCG-January, 2011, p. 62). The naming of a 
National Incident Commander and the inclusion of various agency heads in the command 
structure perhaps compounded this confusion. The amount of authority the Secretary 
exercises as the PFO is scalable to the scope of the event. In naming a National Incident 
Commander, the Secretary maintained overall responsibility for the incident but was able 
to maintain focus on operations throughout her department. The relationship between the 
PFO and the NIC was described in the Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) 
report as being “complementary and mutually supportive” (USCG-January, 2011, p. 64). 
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b. Analysis 
The Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity model describes the 
People domain as the collaborative capacity of the individual. This includes a respect for 
other parties’ expertise, roles and perspectives. In the naming of a National Incident 
Commander, the Principle Federal Officer recognized not only her limitations in 
managing a disaster with the scope of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, but her need to 
continue managing operations of the Department of Homeland Security. In naming U.S. 
Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen as NIC, she clearly delineated the role of the PFO and 
the NIC, allowing the NIC to maintain strategic coordination of the incident and relied 
extensively on the expertise of Admiral Allen and the perspective he brought to 
managing this disaster. 
B. THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER AND THE 
IMPROVISATIONAL THEATER COLLABORATION MODEL 
This section will examine specific observations from the Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill disaster, as documented in after action reviews and government reports. These 
observations will point to instances where a problem occurred, a decision was made 
within the collaborative domain to address that problem, and the principles of 
improvisation, as described in the improvisational theater model were applied and the 
problem was successfully nullified through collaboration. Similarly, instances where a 
problem could have been more effectively addressed through a collaborative process had 
the principles of improvisational theater been applied in those situations. 
1. Principle: Keep the Action Moving 
The principle of “Keep the Action Moving” refers to the need move towards 
achieving the desired outcome, not becoming mired in minutiae or insignificant details, 
and focus on making decisions. 
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a. Observation: Lack of State Integration at Unified Command 
Posts (USCG-September, 2011) 
The National Contingency Plan (NCP) makes provisions for state 
participation in oil spill or hazardous material release response command structures. 
Some states did not fulfill their role in the unified command structures in place for the 
Deepwater Horizon incident for one of two reasons: They did not provide representatives 
to participate in the unified command, or, state representatives were not authorized to 
make decisions on behalf of their state (USCG-September, 2011, p. 12). 
b. Analysis 
Although some states provided representatives to the unified command, if 
those representatives were not empowered to make decisions, they did not provide any 
value to the unified command. When an agency or state representative needs to reach 
back to his or her leadership for authorization on a course of action, that course of action 
comes to a stop until the decisionmaker can be reached, the information provided the 
representative can be relayed, digested by the decisionmaker, a decision made, and that 
decision conveyed to the representative who in turn must pass the decision on to the 
unified command—then the action of the unified command ceases to progress during the 
decision-making process. 
2. Principle: Yes, and… 
The “Yes, and…” principle refers to the need to acknowledge or accept offers as 
opposed to saying “No,” which can limit innovation and creativity sometimes needed to 
address complex problems or issues in the collaborative environment. 
a. Observation: Increasing Response Times to Reports of Oil 
(USCG-September, 2011) 
As reports of oil in the water and along the Gulf coastline became more 
frequent, the NIC determined the U.S. Coast Guard needed to decrease their response 
times to these reports. The USCG Search and Rescue standards were applied to oil 
reports and included mandatory launch of assets within 30 minutes of the report and 
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arriving on-scene within two hours. The teams tasked with search and rescue for the 
USCG, the Marine Safety and Security Teams (MSST) typically do not respond to oil 
spills. Therefore, qualified Coast Guard oil spill responders with prior training and 
experience with assessing oil spills accompanied the MSST on these missions. This rapid 
evaluation of new spills assisted the Incident Command Posts around the Gulf to 
prioritize their response efforts, and based upon the threat posed by new oil 
concentrations, determine which resources should respond (USCG-September, 2011,  
p. 59). 
b. Analysis 
Although the specific conversations leading to the decision to utilize 
MSST for oil spill assessment are not documented, the principle of Yes, and… could 
have been used for this decision. When faced with a problem (“We need to assess oil 
reports more quickly”) the decision makers accepted that this was true and said “Yes, and 
can the USCG Search and Rescue standards be useful somehow?” If the other decision 
makers had said “No,” the use of the MSST and their stringent response time-frames may 
not have emerged as a useful solution. Instead, the decision makers said “Yes, and can we 
ensure our MSST are accurately assessing the amount of oil they are observing?” Again, 
a “No” would have killed this innovation. But an answer of “Yes, and we can place 
trained oil response specialists on our MSST vessels to do the assessment” allowed this 
novel use of MSST resources to solve a problem and positively impact response efforts. 
3. Principle: Allow What is Presented to Change You 
The principle of “Allow What is Presented to Change You” creates a mechanism 
to mitigate “tunnel vision” and preconceived notions about what the reality should be and 
instead, recognizing what actually is the reality. 
a. Observation: The Emergence of the Interagency Solutions Group 
(IASG) (USCG-September, 2011) 
A National Response Team (NRT) was organized in accordance with the 
National Response System (USCG-September, 2011, p. 4) and is comprised of 15 federal 
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agencies. They are responsible for “developing, deconflicting and reconciling 
intergovernmental policy issues that surface during an oil spill response” (USCG-
September, 2011, p. 8). NRTs can be activated as an emergency response team when a 
spill involves a severe threat to public health and welfare, with the primary action being 
serving as counsel and providing recommendations to the National Incident Commander 
(NIC). One problem facing the NRT was the level of coordination needed for this 
incident was primarily at the Department level, which is a higher level than what was 
called for in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
(NCP)5 (USCG-September, 2011, p. 4). The ad hoc IASG assumed the doctrinal duties of 
the NRT, became a self-contained interagency body with decision-making authority, and 
proved adept in promoting interagency unity of effort. The IASG relied on 
representatives from 20 federal agencies and departments, and the FOSC report 
determined that nearly all of the recommendations to come from the IASG were the result 
of group consensus. The IASG itself remained adaptive and flexible in their response, 
dividing itself into seven specialty teams to better focus their efforts on challenges as they 
emerged (USCG-September, 2011, p. 9). 
b. Analysis 
Although a framework existed to bring federal stakeholders together to 
make decisions and guide policy during a large oil spill or hazardous material leak, the 
NIC determined the scope of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, which necessitated a 
different multi-agency coordinating group structure. The NIC initially began managing 
the incident in coordination with the NRT, the NIC allowed these observations, or what 
was presented, to change its course of action and establish the IASG.  
4. Principle: Make Your Fellow Players Look Brilliant 
The “Make Your Fellow Players Look Brilliant” involves setting up partners, 
whether agencies or individuals, for success, rather than failure. Providing the proper 
                                                 
5 The NCP is the federal government’s blueprint for responding to oil spills and hazardous substance 
releases, and establishes the National Response System. 
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equipment and information to collaborative partners will facilitate the execution of this 
principle. 
a. Observation: Disorganized Messaging Costs Credibility with the 
Public (USCG-January, 2011 p. 65) 
During the Deepwater Horizon response, the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security established a centralized crisis communication construct based upon 
the National Response Framework, a more centralized, “top-down” public affairs model 
that countered the public affairs doctrine outlined in the NCP (USCG-January, 2011,  
p. 71). This external affairs structure created additional message review and approval 
layers that hindered the USCG’s ability to meet the requirements of the NCP for 
informing stakeholders of the incident response status. This shift from the NRT Joint 
Information Center model to the NRF Joint Information Center Model also excluded the 
responsible party, British Petroleum, from many public information dissemination 
opportunities leading to a Joint Information Center where message development was not 
coordinated (USCG-January, 2011, p. 67). This lack a comprehensive and inclusive crisis 
communication plan negatively impacted timely and accurate messaging, leading in some 
instances to a loss of credibility with the public (USCG-January, 2011, p. 68). 
b. Analysis 
On the surface, the principle of making your fellow players look brilliant 
may appear to advocate for glossing over errors or mistakes. In improvisation, there 
really are no mistakes, so instead, this principle should encourage setting up fellow 
players for success, not failure. In this instance, a lack of timely and accurate information 
sharing from the response organization to the public created a loss of trust between the 
public and the response agencies, creating an organization where those responsible for 
disseminating information were set up to fail. Establishing coordinated, unified 
messaging protocols for this incident would have mitigated the public distrust of 
organizations that were providing conflicting, outdated or inaccurate information to the 
public. Had the principle of “Make your fellow players look brilliant” been applied to this 
situation, all agencies and organizations, including British Petroleum, would have been 
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included in the information dissemination process via the Joint Information Center, 
setting them up to succeed, as opposed to fail.   
5. Principle: Serve the Good of the Whole 
The principle “Serve the Good of the Whole” references the need to place the 
goals of the entire collaborative environment ahead of the individual goals and objectives 
of any one entity within the collaboration. 
a. Observation: Competing Incident Action Plans (IAP) (USCG-
September, 2011) 
Several supporting agencies found the IAP tactics development meetings 
too time consuming and began developing their own IAPs. The existence of multiple 
IAPs for the same operation resulted in instances where efforts were duplicated and 
resources were purchased or contracted even though those resources were in many cases 
already available and on-scene (USCG-September, 2011, p. 16).  
b. Analysis 
The principle of “Serve the Good of the Whole” is the ultimate goal of 
multi-agency coordination. In this instance, agencies that developed their own IAPs in 
order to avoid participating in what they perceived as a cumbersome process served only 
their interests and their mission. This self-serving approach by individual agencies and 
organizations operating as part of the Unified Area Command may have even been more 
detrimental to their interests, as the duplication of effort and ordering of resources already 
available may have been a waste of those agency’s financial resources and moved 
resources from an operation unaffiliated with the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. A 
coordinated response, driven by a single IAP, provides the best opportunity of an 
efficient use of resources and to reduce the duplication of efforts. The application of the 
“Serve the Good of the Whole” principle in this instance, as opposed to an organizational 
free-lance approach to establishing incident objectives through individual IAPs, would 
have better served the incident response. 
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C. A COMPARISON OF MODELS 
1. How Does the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model 
View Collaboration? 
The Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model is predicated on the notion 
that the collaborative capacity of an organization hinges upon the organization’s 
leadership’s attention to collaboration and the design elements of an organization must 
foster a collaborative environment (Hocevar et al., 2011). This model is also focused 
primary on the development of the model to identify and assess the capacity of agencies 
and organizations to collaborate before the crisis (Hocevar et al., 2011). In this way, the 
Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model can serve as an evaluative framework 
for organizational collaborative capacity.  
Hocevar et al. have also referenced research by Amy Donahue and Robert Tuohy, 
which proposes three recommendations for strengthening the learning process to change 
disaster planning and processing practices. One of the three recommendations cited by 
Hocevar et al. is the need to establish incentives to “institutionalize lessons-learning 
processes at all levels of government” (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Perhaps the model 
proposed by Hocevar et al. could be considered a path forward to institutionalizing 
collaboration among homeland security organizations and agencies. The five domains 
outlined in the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model could be established as 
assessable criteria or evaluation metrics for agencies and organizations to determine their 
collaborative capacity. The existence of these domains was demonstratively evident in 
the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill disaster case study, lending further support to their 
utility in the collaborative process. 
Hocevar et al. have also suggested in their 2006 research that organizations can 
assess their capacity to work with a generic “other” organization (Hocevar et al., 2006). 
Although not reflected in the questions for their 2006 study, Hocevar et al. found that 
organizations, like individuals, may not be compatible with each other (p. 32). 
The criticality of inter-organizational collaborative capacity in homeland security 
for both the conduct of routine task and improvising and innovatively responding to 
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disasters is inescapable, according to Hocevar et al., 2006. Although collaboration may 
not be equally as important in every situation, its importance increases as inter-agency 
decision making and task interdependencies increase. Hocevar et al. have focused their 
research, and the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model, on identifying the 
capacity of organizations in the predisaster preparedness phase, and not waiting until the 
need to collaborate is thrust upon an organization during an emergency or disaster 
(Hocevar et al., 2006). 
2. How Does the Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model View 
Collaboration? 
Improvisation, as used in this research and as a theatrical performance and 
rehearsal style, was originally developed to train individuals with little to no theater 
performance background to be able to perform scripted work on stage. Just as Viola 
Spolin, and later Paul Sills, believed everyone can improvise, the Improvisational Theater 
Collaboration Model suggests anyone, any agency, and any organization can be taught 
the five principles associated with the model and “learn” how to collaborate. Although 
each of the principles of the Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model emerged 
organically during the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, formalizing the model and 
institutionalizing the principles may lead to increased instances of the principles 
facilitating the collaborative process. 
The Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model accounts for the evolving, 
dynamic, unscripted environment in which homeland security agencies, organizations, 
and individuals that works within those entities function, and suggests an institutionalized 
approach to developing the capacity to collaborate, while beneficial, is not imperative. As 
demonstrated in the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill disaster case study, a disaster can bring 
agencies, organizations and individuals together with no-notice and require collaborative 
decision making to achieve the objectives of an incident. The improvisational theater 
model is predicated on the idea that individuals or organizations with limited knowledge 
of the other or experience working together can adhere to the model’s principles and 
collaborate effectively. 
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The Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model can be a tool for evaluating the 
efficacy of a collaborative endeavor but is designed to guide the “how to” of 
collaboration. The principles of the model would be difficult to assess before they were 
pulled from the proverbial toolbox and placed into service during a disaster that called for 
collaboration among agencies and organizations. An organization may not say “Yes, 
and…” or practice the four other principles described in the model during day-to-day 
intra-organizational operations, but it may fully integrate the five principles when called 
upon to collaborate inter-organizationally during disasters or nonemergent planning or 
strategic initiatives. 
3. Examining the Differences 
As stated numerous times throughout this paper, the determination of a better 
model or framework for homeland security collaboration is not the intended outcome. 
The Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model has been shown to be useful in the 
homeland security collaborative context, and the utility of the Inter-organizational 
Collaborative Capacity Model has been demonstrated as well. There are, however, subtle 
differences that may make one model more appropriate depending upon the desired 
result. 
The Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model does not necessarily 
facilitate collaboration or provide a method of collaborating, but it does identify what 
should be present for collaboration to occur. The Improvisational Theater Collaboration 
Model does lay out action-oriented principles that can guide an agency or organization 
towards “doing” collaboration, but it is not as useful as the Inter-organizational 
Collaborative Capacity Model in identifying or assessing an organization’s capacity to 
collaborate.  
The Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model lays a foundation for an 
organization in advance of the need to collaborate in an effort to institutionalize the 
collaborative process and develop an organization’s capacity to collaborate. The 
Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model is designed to facilitate collaboration on the 
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fly, absent the domains described in the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity 
Model.  
In improvisational theater, most anyone who adheres to the commonly accepted 
principles can improvise provided the fellow players are adhering to the principles as 
well. The Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model also supposes that any 
organization or individual following the five principles of the model can be a successful 
collaborator, providing the other organizations or individuals in the collaborative space 
are following the principles as well. The Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity 
Model says organizations may not be compatible with each other, hindering their ability 
to collaborate, even when each of the domains of the model are present within an 
organization. 
Each model recognizes the importance of collaboration to the homeland security 
enterprise, and examples of the implementation of each model are evident in homeland 
security collaboration initiatives, or at least in the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill disaster 
case study. The Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model appears to be geared 
more towards developing and evaluating an organization’s ability to collaborate, while 
the Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model is designed as a tool to teach 
organization’s how to collaborate or facilitate the collaborative process in a dynamic 
disaster environment.  
D. SUMMARY 
Without making the claim that one approach to collaboration was better than 
another, both models were applied to a single case study to demonstrate their 
applicability to homeland security and inter-agency collaboration. Chapter I asked “Is 
there evidence of the principles of improvisation having been successfully applied to the 
collaborative space within which the homeland security enterprise so often operates?” 
Through an analysis of a single case study, the Deepwater Horizon, examples were found 
of each of the five principles having been applied to the collaborative efforts during the 
response to that disaster. Examples of the five Inter-organizational Collaborative 
Capacity Model domains were also found, lending validity to that model’s applicability 
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in the homeland security collaborative environment. Chapter I also indicated the 
applicability of the principles of improvisational theater would be revealed through the 
research and its utility demonstrated. The Deepwater Horizon case study revealed 
multiple instances improvisational theater principles, as they applied to that collaborative 
environment and cited examples of their utility in practice, and where they could have 
been utilized to possibly improve outcomes. 
The two models approach collaboration from two different perspectives. The 
Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model focuses primarily on the domains and 
factors necessary for collaboration to occur between organizations, whereas the 
Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model provides action-oriented principles that can 
be implemented by an organization or agency to facilitate the collaborative process. The 
Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model also suggests the foundation for 
successful collaboration should be laid during the preparedness phase, before a disaster 
occurs and agencies must collaborate during a crisis. The Improvisational Theater 
Collaboration Model, while applicable to nonemergency situations, provides a framework 
for agencies and organizations to collaborate during a disaster or dynamic emergency 
situation, even when the domains identified in the Inter-organizational Collaborative 
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V. SYNTHESIS OF COLLABORATION, IMPROVISATIONAL 
THEATER, AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
Sometimes it works, sometimes it fails, but that's what we face when we're 
dealing with improvisation.  
–Jan Garbarek 
 
The analysis in the preceding chapter demonstrates that collaboration sometimes 
occurs, and sometimes it does not occur. Sometimes collaborative efforts are successful 
and fulfill the predetermined objectives, and sometimes those efforts are not successful 
and the objectives are not met. Those instances of collaboration, or noncollaboration, 
were then evaluated using two collaborative models. This thesis sought to answer 
whether or not the principles of improvisation can be applied to the homeland security 
collaborative environment. The research of the Deepwater Horizon case study and 
analysis through the Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model indicated it can. This 
chapter will explore how the improvisational theater collaboration model could be 
applied, what that model would look like, and how that model would frame the 
collaborative space in homeland security. 
A. AN IMPROVISATIONAL THEATER-BASED MODEL FOR 
COLLABORATION 
The homeland security environment relies heavily on collaboration. Evidence of 
collaboration, and a need to improve collaboration, has been documented in this thesis 
through the examination and analysis of the Deepwater Horizon case study. The success 
of a collaborative effort relies on ability of each agency or organization involved to 
function within the collaborative space. Since the “how” of collaboration has not yet been 
integrated into policy, guidance documents, training curriculum, or the exercise 
evaluation process, perhaps a model, or framework that describes the components of 
collaboration, will benefit the collaborative process.  
Just as the common structure of the Incident Command System and the National 
Incident Management System-mandated shift away from coded language to plain text for 
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multi-agency/multi-jurisdiction responses were designed and implemented with the goal 
of improving the ability for agencies to work better in the field (DHS, 2008), a common 
model for collaboration may also work to improve agencies and organizations abilities to 
collaborate in the homeland security environment. 
B. A VISUALIZATION OF THE MODEL 
The homeland security enterprise is also accustomed to operating in structures, 
organizational charts, hierarchies, continuums and cycles. 6  The improvisational 
collaborative model, as I have envisioned; however, is not hierarchical as no one 
principle outweighs the importance of another. Nor is this model a continuum or cycle, 
where one principle feeds into another principle. The Improvisational Theater 
Collaboration Model, as I have envisioned it, requires the application of each principle to 
fully illuminate the collaborative space. If one agency is “serving the good of the whole” 
and ensuring the needs of their agency are not placed above the needs of another agency, 
but is not saying “yes, and…” to the ideas of others, then the collaboration may not be as 
effective as if all of the principles were being applied. 
I have drawn a comparison of agencies and organizations to players in an 
improvised theater performance. If agencies and organizations are the players, than the 
collaborative space is the stage (since collaboration does not necessarily occur in a 
physical space like an incident command post, emergency operations center, or executive 
conference room, I tended to not think of collaboration as occurring in a specific place). 
The image of footlights and spotlights immediately came to me, and the notion of each of 
the five principles of improvisation serving to illuminate that space led to the 
development of the illustrated improvisational theater collaboration model on the 
following page. Theatrical lighting, like the application of the five improvisational theater 
principles, must also be balanced. Lighting technicians balance cool-colored lights like 
blues and violets with warm-colored lights like yellows and ambers to create or enhance 
                                                 
6 The Incident Command System Command and General Staff organizational charts, National 
Response Framework’s Emergency Support Functions, the Preparedness and Intelligence Cycles, and the 
SAFECOM Interoperable Communications Continuum are all examples of widely-used structures within 
the homeland security enterprise. 
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shadow and light. Similarly, the principles of improvisation should be evenly balanced in 
the collaborative space, and all five should be present. As no agency or organization is to 
outshine another in the collaborative, space, each principle puts forth the same amount of 
light onto the stage. As agencies within the collaborative domain must work to serve the 
good of the whole, each principle must illuminate the entire space, not just a specific 
area.
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IMPROVISATIONAL THEATER COLLABORATION MODEL 
 
 
Figure 3.   A Visualization of the Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model
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C. SUMMARY 
The Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model provides a common structure 
for inter-agency collaboration. Much like a structured format for incident command (the 
Incident Command System), this model provides a structured format for collaboration. 
The visualization of the model demonstrates the importance of each of the five principles 
contained within the model, and that each of the five principles is needed to “illuminate” 
the collaborative space. The model is intentionally designed to not place importance of 
one principle over another, and that each principle casts the same amount of light on the 
collaborative space.  
The title of this paper begins with the phrase “Play Well With Others.” That is a 
phrase borrowed from my time studying theater and improvisation at the New Actors 
Workshop in New York City, and a variation on a phrase used as an evaluation metric on 
my preschool report card, “Plays Well With Others.” The phrase did not mean the student 
was everyone’s best friend, never argued, avoided conflict, or was necessarily a follower 
or leader. It meant that the student knew how to function in a group without making the 
others cry (this was as true for preschool as it was for acting school). It meant that the 
student generally adhered to social norms and was polite, could manage conflict, argue a 
position without personal attacks or taking attacks personally, and knew when to lead and 
when to let others take the lead. This model for collaboration, and the visualization of 
that model, seeks to highlight those traits of playing well with others. Sharing the 
spotlight, seeing everything that has been lit on the stage, and crafting a narrative with 
(not for or instead of) your fellow players is the goal of this framework and the 
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VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Theater Games are a process applicable to any field, discipline, or subject 
matter which creates a place where full participation, communication, 




This researched narrative is the first literary contribution that applies 
improvisational theater to the collaboration and multi-agency coordination process. This 
narrative has identified commonalities between the collaborative space and improvised 
theater performance and has proposed a model for enhancing the capacity for 
collaboration among agencies and organizations in the homeland security enterprise. 
The reader of this narrative can begin identifying opportunities within his or her 
own agency or organization’s collaborative efforts to implement the collaborative model 
based upon the principles of improvisational theater to those efforts. It is important that 
the reader understands the inherent flexibility of the improvisational theater guidelines 
and uses his or her intuition, creativity and innovative capacity to determine how best to 
apply these principles to facilitate the sharing of risk throughout a collaborative process. 
This narrative offers the most significance to homeland security leaders and 
practitioners, if they are willing to adhere to the improvisational theater principles 
outlined within this narrative and while reading the analysis, especially principle of “Yes, 
and….” Ideally, the reader must be able to think, while reading this narrative, 
“Improvisation can be applied to multi-agency coordination and collaborative decision 
making. Yes, and…” 
Early on in this narrative, a question was asked: Can improvisational theater 
principles be applied to homeland security collaborative environment? Through the 
examination of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill disaster, examples were provided where 
either one of the five principles of improvisational theater was applied to the 
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collaborative problem space and a solution was found. Or, if one of the five principles 
had been applied, then perhaps a problem could have been solved or avoided. While 
Deepwater Horizon is but one case study, the complexity of that disaster and the 
applicability of improvisational theater principles to multiple instances of collaboration 
within that case study provides a compelling answer to that question: Yes, they can. 
These improvisational theater principles, or the model proposed based upon these 
principles, is not the only approach to collaboration within the homeland security 
environment. Certainly the Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity model is 
applicable to that environment. The analysis presented in this narrative indicates, 
however, that the Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model is applicable as well. 
This narrative also put forth several hypotheses. Agencies and organizations 
within the homeland security enterprise can be better collaborative partners. Homeland 
security is open to innovation and creativity. Homeland security, like most things, has 
evolved through innovation and creativity. That innovation, however, has not yet 
extended into multi-agency collaboration. The principles of improvisational theater may 
improve the ability of agencies and organizations that make up the homeland security 
enterprise to work in a collaborative space. Homeland Security is, in many ways, 
improvised everyday. Perhaps the most important hypotheses, built on top of the 
hypotheses above, is this: If each agency, organization, jurisdiction, or private company 
working within the homeland security enterprise can view itself and its counterparts as 
performers in an improvised play and accept that each performer must rely on each other, 
allow themselves to be relied upon, share successes and failures without becoming mired 
in finger-pointing and focus instead on moving toward the desired outcome, then 
improvisational theater and its guiding principles will have increased their capacity to 
collaborate and served the collaborative process that is so important to homeland 
security.  
Each of these hypotheses was supported through the research and analysis that 
comprises this narrative. Examples from Deepwater Horizon were provided indicating 
agencies and organizations do not always collaborate as well as they could, and could be 
better collaborative partners. Instances of innovation within the homeland security 
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enterprise like the integration of new technologies described in Chapter I abound, and by 
the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s support 
and publishing of this narrative shows some degree of openness for creativity. Examples 
of truly innovative approaches to collaboration are elusive, and through the course of 
research for this narrative, no examples of innovative approaches to collaboration could 
be found, supporting the hypothesis that innovation has left the development of the 
collaborative space largely untouched. The unscripted nature of homeland security was 
revealed in the timeline of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill disaster that could not have 
been written until it had occurred, and improvisational theater principles were 
unknowingly often applied to collaborations during the response to that disaster.  
The affirmation of the final, and what I described as most important, hypothesis is 
less clear. The validity of that hypothesis perhaps cannot be known until the application 
of the guiding principles for the improvised theater performer is consciously integrated 
into the collaborative homeland security space. However, based upon the evidence 
offered in support of the other hypotheses, it is my belief that agencies and organizations 
within the homeland security enterprise can find collaborative capacity through the use of 
the principles of improvisational theater. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
In an academic environment, I have had the opportunity to put a voice to some 
grand ideas, verbose thoughts and deep musings about homeland security, emergency 
management, constitutional law, privacy, the intelligence community, and now, 
improvisational theater and its applicability to homeland security. In my mind, however, 
is the voice of a professor asking “So what?” Here is what I have distilled into the so 
what. 
The principles that guide improvised theater are applicable to collaboration and 
the homeland security environment. These principles, while not necessarily providing 
step-by-step instructions for working in a collaborative environment under every 
circumstance, do provide a “how” of “how to collaborate.” These principles have been 
effectively taught to grade school-aged children for decades, surely homeland security 
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practitioners can learn them. Training curriculum for improvisational theater already 
exists. Methods of observing whether or not the principles are being applied during a 
performance or rehearsal already exist. Most of the work has been done with regards to 
the development of the framework. That work was not done during the writing of this 
thesis, but more than seventy years ago in a classroom in Chicago. Most of these 
principles are already being used in the collaborative space within the homeland security 
environment; we just do not know we are using these principles. In the writing of this 
thesis, I have had the opportunity to point out what has worked in the theatrical domain, 
and how it already appears to be working in homeland security. The secret is out. There is 
a “how to do collaboration.” 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEXT STEPS AND FUTURE STUDY 
This narrative applied two models for collaboration to an incident requiring 
unprecedented coordination across all levels of government and sectors. The goal of that 
comparison was not to emerge with a superior collaborative model, but rather, an 
alternate model to facilitate the collaborative process and to validate that model through 
analysis. It is recommended that this model be included with others, like the Inter-
organizational Collaborative Capacity model, in future discussions, research and 
evaluations of homeland security collaborative efforts.  
As the initial effort to apply improvisational theater to multi-agency collaboration, 
much will be left to future research efforts, especially for the continued integration of 
improvisational theater principles into the collaboration process. Identifying performance 
metrics, inclusion of those metrics into exercise evaluation criteria, and the development 
of an instructional curriculum for the introduction of these principles may be next steps. 
1. Improvisation Model for Training Would-Be Collaborators 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Emergency Management Institute 
is full of training courses, delivered both in a classroom setting and through the distance 
learning environment, aimed at preparing homeland security professionals to do their 
jobs. Courses in Incident Command, planning, even tsunami preparedness are all offered. 
There are, however, no courses teaching homeland security professionals how to 
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collaborate. There are courses that teach effective communication, leadership, problem 
solving, and even a course about multi-agency coordination, all components of 
collaboration, but not a single course that says, “This is how you collaborate in the 
homeland security environment.  
Improvisation, however, is something that is taught across the country, to kids and 
in retirement communities, corporate executives and college thespians. Taking the five 
principles of improvisation that have been synthesized into a model for collaboration, and 
turning that model into the basis of a training course designed to teach collaboration to 
homeland security practitioners is a possible next step in the research, development and 
refinement of this improvisation-based model for collaboration. 
Once these principles have been integrated into the homeland security vernacular 
through a training program, additional opportunities to integrate these principles into 
planning and exercise initiatives may be revealed.  
2. Improvisation Model to Evaluate Collaborative Efforts 
Collaboration in the homeland security environment is difficult to assess. This 
thesis puts forth several examples in the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill disaster where 
collaboration either occurred and adhered to one of two models of inter-agency 
collaboration, or did not occur but the use of one of the models may have helped facilitate 
the collaborative process.  
A 2013 GAO report addressing the coordination challenges of information 
sharing recommended “Individual accountability for collaborative efforts can be 
reinforced through performance management systems by identifying competencies 
related to collaboration and setting performance expectations for collaboration. 
Incorporating performance metrics that emphasize collaboration and coordination with 
partners can benefit multiagency efforts.” (GAO, 2013, p. 35). This recommendation 
could serve as the starting point for additional study into the application of the 
improvisational framework to incidents, perhaps as part of the after-action review 
process, to evaluate the level to which collaboration was occurring during the incident. 
Did agency representatives allow what was presented through the course of the incident 
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to alter their approach, or did they move forward, ballistically, never wavering from their 
initial trajectory. Was one organization sabotaging the performance of another agency or 
organization? Did one agency appear isolated from the decision-making process or seem 
to be serving its goals and not the common goals of the incident? Those questions may be 
further refined into performance metrics to evaluate, post-incident, whether or not 
collaboration was occurring. The same metrics may also prove valuable during an 
incident or through the preincident planning process (during the drafting of All-Hazard 
Emergency Operations Plans, Hazard Mitigation Plans, or other planning efforts hinging 
upon a collaborative process) to assess the collaborative space or trouble-shoot instances 
where the collaborative process is not getting off of the ground.  
D. SUMMARY 
The analysis of the Deepwater Horizon case study demonstrated the applicability 
of improvisational theater principles to collaboration in the homeland security 
environment. This supported the hypotheses about collaboration and improvisation, and 
provided the basis for the creation of the Improvisational Theater Collaboration Model.  
This model for collaboration suggests a “how” for collaboration. The principles 
are supported through a variety of improvisational theater games that have been used as 
teaching tools for decades, and as discovered through the analysis of Deepwater Horizon, 
some of these principles are already in use, although not in the framework as presented in 
this thesis. 
This paper is the initial effort to contribute the principles of improvisational 
theater to the homeland security collaborative environment. As such, there is much work 
to be done to integrate these principles into homeland security operations as a 
collaborative structure. Future steps for the progression of this model may include the 
development of an improvisational-based training curriculum for homeland security 
practitioners to hone their collaborative skills and enhance their capacity to collaborate. 
Improvisation is already being taught to children, performers, and business executives 
across the country, so the manipulation of improvisational theater games to suit homeland 
security practitioners is a realistic objective. These same principles can also be used to 
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develop performance metrics to evaluate interagency collaboration, both during 
emergencies or disasters or nonemergent preparedness and prevention initiatives like plan 
development or the conduct of exercises. As an evaluative tool, this model can also be 
used during an emergency or disaster to diagnose barriers to the collaborative process and 
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